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Chapter I
Group Decision-Mskin6_ An Information Processing Approach
J
The history of bhe behavioral sci_ac_ i_ i_ pa_% a _:eco_d of
attempts to construct theories to explain and predict a wide variety of
individual and group behavior. Indeed, diversity is one of this science's
chief characteristics; it is reflected both in the languages and techniques
with which its theories are formulated, tested, and discussed, e.g. the
literature on group dynamics (Cartwright and Zander, 1960), the studies
on interpersonal influence (Blake and Mouton, 1961), and the research on
individual and group risk taking (Kogan and Wallach, 1964). In keeping with
this heterogeneity the advent of computer simulation has led to the develop-
ment of a further set of behavioral theories. Formerly theories of social
behavior were stated either in prose (e.g. Homans, 1961) or in mathemati-
cal notation (e.go Thibaut and Kelly, 1959). More recently the ability to
simulate the behavior of such theoretical systems (e.g. Gullahorn and
Gullahorn, 1962) has led to the inclusion of computer programs as a method
of expressing theories of human behavior.
It should be noted immediately that simulation is not itself a type
of theory. It is at best a precept, a method, a technique for orienting
inquiry into the characteristics and behavior of a particular organism.
In practice_ simulation is a technique for building models that reproduce
part or all of the output of a behaving system. It is theoretically and
empirically significant if it is employed as the method by which an exist-
ing body of theory is submitted to test. In short, simulation is a vehicle
with which empirical models of a given theory can be constructed and tested.
- l-
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Initial applications of this technique have raised a number of
intriguing issues. For by demonstrating that the practical problems of
creating such models can be solved# questions concerning their empirical
justification as well as their research potential are brought to the fore.
For instance# if one is presented with a computer program which purports
to simulate some aspect of human behavior what criteria are to be used to
measure its "goodness-of-fit?" If the program chooses a response that
differs from the observed, how is one to classify the error? It can be
recorded as a "simple error, " or one can attempt to search back through
the program to identify what might be c_lled the "error in the decision
process." Alternatively, consider the case where one is presented with a
model that reproduces some observed behavior with a high degree of accuracy.
Given such a program can one identify those components which are in some
sense "minimally sufficient" for the explanation of the test data?
Finally, what if a given program pertains solely to individual
decision-making behavior? Suppose it to be capable of predicting certain
aspects of an individual's decision behavior. In this case the question
of interest is how to "aggregate" the individual theory into a theory of
group or organizational behavior. That is to say, the issue is raised of
how to sDecif__. the interactive _o_o_gg_q...............pmp1_ye_a _v_ _na_,_a_1_1= _ +_=+
group behavior can be generated by interconnecting models of individuals.
These examples by no means exhaust the range of problems posed by
the application of this technique. They form, however, some of the basic
questions to _hich the research reported in this study is addressed. For
although the investigation is concerned with developing a theory of group
decision-making, tests are conducted through the medium of simulation.
Hence, questions about its empirical import cannot be avoided, and answers
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must be provided.
The primary objective of this research is to develop a theory that
can accomplish the task posed by the last question noted above. In brief#
the goal is to account for the decision behavior of groups by an appro-
priate combination of models of individual behavior. Put in other words,
this research is an attempt to construct a theory that is capable of explain-
ing group decision behavior from a knowledge of the decision processes of
its participants.
In order to develop a theory that will account for a group's decision
behavior in this manner several theoretical difficulties must be faced and
answers specified. Not the least of these are such problems as: What body
of theory concerning decision-making behavior can be applied to explain
the behavior of groups as a function of its members? Whatever theoretical
schema is chosen it must be able to account for the leadership and influ-
ence relations that are a part of group behavior. In effect, it has to be
able to answer the question: What behavior patterns or characteristics of
the participants can be used to explain the leader-follower relations that
evolve? In what manner and by that mechanism(s) does the process of arriv-
ing at a group decision affect (influence) the decision processes of the
individuals concerned? Much experimental work has been done on the charac-
teristics of both of these processes (Cartwright, 1965). But a theory that
purports to account for observed behavior must include a detailed specifica-
tion of the mechanisms by which interpersonal influence and leadership rela-
tions are taken into consideration. Lastly, it must not be forgotten that,
if a theory is to be constructed that can accommodate these difficultues,
an experimental environment is required within which it can be subjected to
test. For, if the theory is to be used to explain group decision behavior,
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then there must be a replicable decision task within the confines of which
the behavior of groups can be matched against that of the theory.
Though there are many other problems to be faced by any theory
that proposes to account for group decision-making in its entirety, these
questions have been selected as the ones around which to organize the
presentation of this research. The discussion will proceed by treating
each of these topics and by presenting in turn the solutions proposed as
well as the model into which they are incorporated.
I. The Unit of Primary Importance -- Group or Individual?
There are two main approaches to the development of a theory of
group decision behavior. The first is to start with a set of concepts
and postulates about group decision-making, and from these generate a set
of testable hypotheses which can be used to account for observable behavior.
Clearly, this is the general procedure that has guided the growth of theories
of large groups or organizations (e.g. Blau and Scott, 1962; March and Simon,
1958). Such theories contain propositions to account for various classes
of behaviors. But perhaps because of their generality they seldom state 3
in any detail, the actual mechanisms by which these hypotheses are to be
em_irically specified. Consider s for e_am_l_. _ _IF,_+.'_nn _f' _÷_=_
that are taken from a theory of planning and innovation in organizations:
(i) "Those variables that are largely within the control
of the problem-solving individual or organizational
unit will be considered first."
(2) "If a satisfactory program is not discovered by these
mea_. attention will be directed to changing other
variables that are not under the direct control of
the problem solvers."
W-5-
(3) "If a satisfactory program is still not evolved,
attention will be turned to the criteria that the
program must satisfy, and an effort will be made to
relax these criteria 'so that a satisfactory program
can be found."
tives will be tested sequentially." I_
These propositions, though more detailed than most, do not contain within
themselves a specification of the mechanisms by which they are to be
empirically interpreted. In short, if they are to be stated in such a
manner that they can be directly subjected to test, their concepts and
hypothesized relations must be delineated in greater detail. Though the
empirical interpretation of some may be quite straightforward (e.g. Cyert
and March, 1963)_ it is reasonable to presume that the resulting proposi-
tions will be phrased in terms of the group as the basic unit. Concepts
such as "satisfactory" and "criteria" could be defined by reference to
the group itself or the organization as a whole. This would lead, however,
to the difficulty of accounting for their origins as well as the mechanisms
which guide their transmission through the organization and acceptance by
the group.
An alternative approach is to interpret hypotheses of organizational
(group) behavior in terms of the behavior of the individual members of
._ vA_ _uup is composed. That is to say, treat the individual as the
basic unit of a group or organization such that the behavior of the whole
is explained as a function of the interaction of its parts. Then 3 if the
behavior of these parts changes, the direction and content of the change
can be used both as an influence measure and as a measure of the effect
l/ March and Simon, op. cit. pp. 170-80
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of the group upon the individual. Such a position requires that the basic
concepts and relations no longer refer to group phenomena. Instead they
must encompass the relevant characteristics of individual decision-making
behavior. In brief, a theory of individual decision behavior is recuired
that is sufficient to account for the behavior of individuals, both when
acting by themselves and when acting as a member of a group.
To examine some of the implications of this approach suppose for
the moment that such a theory of individual behavior exists. Furthermore,
suppose that the theory is stated in sufficient detail to permit it to
account for each individual's behavior as well as the effects the group
decision process has on the behavior of its participants. Finally, assume
that the theory has been subjected to and has survived a number of empir-
ical tests. Having assumed into existence a testable theory that can
account for the behavior of individuals as individuals or as members of
a group, to what use can such a theory be put? The proposed answer is to
employ this theory as the empirical base for theories of organizational
behavior. In effect, it is being suggested that existing theories of
organizational behavior could be "reduced" _ to this testable theory of
individual decision-making behavior.
If the reduction process is to succeed it implies that the theory
of individual behavior must be constructed in such a manner that it is
capable of explaining individual as well as group behavior. For this to
2_/ For an excellent discussion of the process of reduction in empirical
science see: E. Nsgel, The Structure of Science# Harcourt, Brace
and World, New York, 1961, Ch. ii; and P. Oppenheim and H. Putnam,
"Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis, " in H. Feigl, et al (eds.)
Minnesota Studies in the Philoso_h[ of Scienc% University of Minnesota
Press, Vol. II, 195-_, pp. 3-36.
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occur two conditions must be satisfied: The first requires that the hypo-
theses of organizational theories must be deducible from the hypotheses
and postulates of the theory of individual behavior. If the hypotheses of
or_anizat_nnsT_r...........+h_ _+_in_v..v-_^-_,_o _L_d expressions that do no_ apr_ar
in the theory of individual behavior, then it is not possible to meet the
first criterion. In this case various assumptions or further hypotheses
must be introduced to link the terms in the individual theory to the con-
cepts and expressions in the organizational theories. For instance, if one
is to be able to infer hypotheses about organizational conflict or about
tendencies toward isolation and collaboration among groups, the individual
theory must either already contain these terms and relations or additional
postulates must be introduced to allow the derivation to take place.
The second main condition is that the basic postulates or principal
hypotheses of the individual theory must be empirically testable as well as
being reasonably well confirmed by the available evidence -- properties
assumed to be true of the theory mentioned above. The purpose of this
criterion is to ensure that essentially trivial reduction theories are not
constructed. It would not be an important accomplishment to construct a
set of hypotheses about individual behavior from which theories of organi-
zational behavior could be deduced, if it were then not possible to subject
them to empirical test. Hence 3 before one can accept a theory of individual
decision-making as a possible basis for the reduction of theories of organi-
zational behavior it must be demonstrated that its postulates or main hypo-
theses are both subject to test and reasonably well confirmed by the avail-
able evidence.
The theory of group behavior proposed in this paper is based upon
the latter of these two approaches. It is an attempt to specify a theory
-8-
of individual behavior that is sufficient to serve as the reducing agent.
How well it succeeds in this endeavor will be examined after the theory
itself, the experimental environment in which it is subjected to test, and
the daza which determine its ability to account for group behavior have
been discussed.
. The Theoretical Approach
To explain a group's decision behavior when it is engaged upon a
specified task, it is posited at this level of detail that it is first
necessary to know the decision processes of each member of the group with
respect to this task. To know an individual's decision processes implies
the existence of a theory of individual declsion-making from which the
behavior in question can be inferred. To be able to deduce the specific
sequence of actions that constitutes an individual's observable behavior
requires a theoretical system in which it is possible to delimit decision
processes in some detail. The theoretical schema that meets this require-
ment 3 and as a consequence is the one employed in this research, is an
information processing theory of human decision-making (Newell, Shaw and
Simon, 1958; Reitman, 1965).
An information processing theory accounts for the process of human
problem solving by identifying the types of decision processes employed
by humans while solving problems or making decision. It is a basic
assumption of the theory that decision processes can be isolated and oper-
ationally defined. Moreover, it is assumed that sequences of observed
behavior can be generated by whole programs of such processes, where a
program constitutes an explicit statement of the processes to be used as
well as the structure by which they are linked together.
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That such a set of decision rules (program) can be considered to
be a theory is evinced by satisfying the requirement that it must be possi-
ble to deduce unequivocally the externally observable behavior that will
be pi_oduued by lb. To ensure that this condition is met, t_e program of
processing rules is translated into a formal language (in this case a
computer language), and the logical consequences are derived by performing
the particular operations according to the specified rules.
Theories of individual behavior have been developed to account for
a number of aspects of human information processing, e.g. rote learning
(Felgenbaum, 1963)3 hypothesis testing behavior in a binary choice situation
(Feldman, Tonge and Kanter, 1961), and the acquisition of sequential pattern
concepts (Simon and Kotovsky, 1963). There is also sufficient evidence to
suggest that decislon-making behavior can be successfully investigated
in a number of empirical contexts. For instance, the decision behavior
of individuals engaged in the solution of problems in logic (Newell 3 Shaw
and Simon, 1957), geometry (Gelernter, Hansen, and Loveland, 1960), chess
(Newell, Shaw and Simon, 1958)_ and portfolio selection (Clarkson, 1962),
to mention but a few examples, can and have been used as the bases upon
which to test the empirical validity of many of the hypothesized decision
processes. This is not to say that all hypotheses of a particular theory
of human decision behavior could be tested in each of these problem situa-
tions. Manifestly, some hypotheses will be peculiar to specific contexts.
The presumption is3 however, that a number of these hypotheses can be sub-
jected to test in a variety of situations, and that this number is suffi-
cient to guarantee the empirical testability of the resulting theory.
Implicit in this last statement is the further assumption that
invariances exist in the structure of the decision processes of different
i0-
individuals. Indeed, it is assumed that these invariances not only exist
but that they can be isolated, identified, and empirically confirmed.
For example, the theory of human problem solving (Newell, Shaw and Simon,
±_o) postulates the existence in an individual of a memory, some primitive
information processes, and a hierarchy or program of decision rules. An
application of this theory to a problem such as how humans acquire con-
cepts of sequential patterns (Simon and Kotovsky, 1963) turns these postu-
lates into testable hypotheses. This transformation is accomplished by
specifying for the particular context the structure and contents of memory,
the requisite information processes, as well as the order in which these
processes are to be related to one another. Such a specification of the
general theory is called a model of the behavior under consideration
(Brodbeck, 1959). If it has been suitably constructed the model can
account for the observed behavior. If it were not possible to represent
the structure of these processes in information theoretic terms, then one
could not transform these postulates into the testable hypotheses of a
specific model of human decision behavior (Clarkson and Pounds, 1963). In
effect, it is being argued that it is not possible to construct a testable
theory of individual decision-making behavior unless such structural invar-
iances exist among the decision processes of different problem solvers.
If, on the basis of the research already conducted, one can accept
the statement that theories can be constructed which explain an individual
decision behavior, then it is apparent that the first part of the reduction
process has been accomplished. For, to have at hand a testable theory of
individual behavior is to provide the empirical basis for theories of group
and organizational behavior in the manner noted above. However, to complete
the reduction process, some hypotheses or assumptions are required that will
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permit one to take a theory of individual decision-making and infer from it
the main components of a theory of organizational behavior.
To develop an information processing theory of individual behavior
a postulate is employed that asserts the existence of struct_ral _nv_iAnce
in the decision processes of problem solvers. But groups of all sizes are
composed of individuals. Hence, the ability to infer from individual to
group would be provided by a postulate that asserts the existence of invar-
lances between the structure of individual and group decision processes.
The basis of this posit -- which will be referred to as the second postu-
late of invariance -- resides in inductive and empirical grounds. It cannot
be proved as a theorem. Indeed, the only grounds upon which it can be sup-
ported, other than by empirical test, is its consistency with the first
postulate of invariance incorporated in the theory of individual decision-
making behavior. Essentially, the postulate represents an appeal to parsi-
mony as a rule of procedure. It is a suggestion that this is the appropriate
way in which Occam's razor should be applied. Its theoretical value resides
in the license it provides to interpret organizational theories in terms of
an individual theory. Its empirical import can only be determined by the
appropriate tests, to wit: does the application of this postulate permit
a group's decision behavior to be explained by a theory of individual
de cis ion-maklng?
o-12-
Interpersonal Influence and the Leader-Follower Relation _
In order to discuss the processes by which the theory of group
behavior proposed in this study accounts for interpersonal influence and
the leader-follower relations, it is first necessary to describe some of
the main components of an adaptive theory of individual behavior. To begin
with, information processing theories represent the decision processes that
generate observed behavior by what are called discrimination or decision
nets (Clarkson and Pounds, 1963; Taylor, 1965). Such a net is an associated
llst of tests or filters through which information from memory or the environ®
ment passes. Each test or node in the net is the name of a process. And
the behavior of the decision process itself is the result of the items in
the net selecting and operating upon the received information. Since dis-
crimination nets have an associative structure, and since decision processes
can be represented by asequential list of operations, decision behavior can
readily be accounted for by such nets. It follows that to be able to identify
a specific decision process one needs to know the contents of the tests in
the net as well as the manner in which they are interconnected. Once this
is known the behavior of the decision net is determined. For the observed
behavior is a result of these processes acting upon the information provided
by the memory or environment. Hence; a knowledge of the stru_÷_1_ a._ co_e_z
of discrimination nets is vital to the explanation of observed behavior.
32 The discussion in this section is indebted to the research on adaptive
decision processes conducted by P. G. Eglinton part of which is reported
in Eglinton (1965).
Consider, for a minute, a simple decision net as shown in Figure 1
where each test is resolved in a binary 3 yes or no, fashion. Suppose that
each of the three tests performs separate tests on the available information
A Binary Decision Net
Input
Figure i
and selects outputs accordingly. Such a net will respond differentially
to alterations in inputs. But without the addition of some external mechan-
ism it is unable to reorder the sequence in which the tests are performed 3
add new nodes, or delete existing ones. In brief, the net in Figure 1 is
not an adaptive mechanism, even though it is capable to generating different
responses to a given stream of inputs.
To account for the observed growth, decay and general flexibility
of human decision structures (Brunet t 1957; Miller, Galanter, and Pribram,
1960) it is necessary to incorporate mechanisms that permit change within
discrimination nets to take place. Accordingly# as soon as an adaptive change
of decision nets is considered, a higher level process is required to monitor
the growth and collapse of the nets.
The model of the adaptive process that is used in this research con-
sists of a Monitor and its attendant decision nets. The Monitor itself can
be represented by its decision processes. Its function is to effect
changes in the decision structures that are under its control. In addition 3
the Monitor requires a set of well defined rules with which it is able to
determine when the behavior produced by the operating programs (decision
nets) does not satisfy certain criteria. A more complete model would
have a hierarchy of Monitors 3 each one attending to the decision rules
of the Monitor below it. For the purposes of this research, however3 the
simplest form, compatible with that which will achieve an explanation of
learning behavior (Minsky, 1963), was selected. The model is shown in
outline form in _ 2.
An Adaptive Model
>I' Sufficiency Criteria I<
Monitor
Evaluative Processes
I Operating Programs
"IExternal Responses I
Information from
memor_ and
environment
Figure 2
A Monitor as given in __ can contain a variety of evaluation
mechanisms. These processes contrast the operating program's behavior
with that desired by the Monitor's goals or sufficiency criteria. Though
it would be possible to include a planning or look-ahead device at this
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level (Hayes, 1965), such a process belongs logically to the next higher
level. A planning level is not included here as the experimental environ-
ment (to be discussed shortly) reduced the usefulness of such a process to
a minimum.
According to the adaptive mechanism depicted in Fi6ure 2_ altera-
tions in operating programs take place as a result of actions taken by the
Monitor. Viewed in this manner "learning" is a process of altering opera-
ting programs. Whether one is learning a new set of programs or how to
apply an existing set to new tasks, much of what constitutes learning can
be represented by the growth and collapse of decision nets.
When two or more individuals are required to form a group, such
that the end result of their joint deliberations is a group decision, each
individual's behavior as well as the group's decision be mmmes a part of
the environment for each Monitor. Thus, if individual learning can be
accommodated by these mechanisms, then so can what is known as interper-
sonal influence. Accordingly, in this research learning and interpersonal
influence are treated in a similar manner. That is to say, both processes
can lead an individual to change his operating program. And in accordance
with the causal view of influence (March, 1952; Simon, 1957) to say that
A_ has influenced B is interpreted by the model to mean A_ has effected an
alteration in B's operating program.
In order to specify the procedures by which B can be induced to
change his decision processes in response to some external event, one must
delimit those processes which are activated by himself (individual learning
and changing-one's-mind behaviorlfrom those that are evoked by the behavior
of others (interpersonal influence). The former are accounted for in the
model by a set of Monitor processes that pertain solely to individual
behavior. To account for the latter behavior, however 3 processes having to
-16-
do wlth the leader-follower relation dominance have to be introduced.
For, though influence is defined to have taken place when B's net has
undergone change in response to some action of A__ the mechanism which
selects B and not A to be !n_fluence d has to be included.
In studies of interpersonal influence (Blake and Mouton, 1961)
one of the important variables appears to be that of stimulus and response
generalization. Homans in Social Behavior proposes the following proposi-
tion to account for this behavior:
"If in the recent past the occurrence of a particular
stimulus-situatlon has been the occasion on which a
man's activity has been rewarded, then the more simi-
lar the present stimulus-situation is to the past one,
the more likely he is to emit the activity, or some
similar activity, now." (1961, p. 53)
The essence of this proposition is incorporated into the model by permit-
ting interpersonal influence between A_ and B to take place only when it
is the second time that an influence attempt has been made by A to B in
m
a similar stlmulus-situation. A stimulus-sltuatlon is defined in terms
of the outcomes provided by the experimental task. Hence, if the current
outcome has occurred earlier, and if on that occasion A attempted to influ-
ence B's response, and if he does so again on the present occasion, then
A wlll influence B -- B's net will undergo a change.
Nothing that hs_ h_ _a _ _o_ o......÷_ _ _^ _^_^- _-_ ......
relation. That is, why and under what conditions can A influence B_ rather
than the other way around? The answer to this question lles partly within
the experimental task which was chosen as the testing ground for the theory.
Though the task itself will be discussed shortly, one of its features is
that it permits subjects to make their decisions in any fashion they choose.
The decision procedures that they adopt can be classified on a risky-
conservative continuum. Research on the effects of risk taking on group
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decision-making (Kogan and Wallach, 1964) lead one to believe that group
decisions are on the average more "risky" than those taken separately by the
individual participants. However, such findings are confounded by the effect
_ _,,,,.,,i._,.i,. ,,,J,,,I. ,.I,.,,,_gi.i,. i.i,V.L ll,_ Vt.i l_l,,i. _l.i..LO U._I.L,U_=.I._ U.I.ULI;_ _U.I..L.LII_ _L_ _rLl.(_ Uw.I_.UW, J._r,._Ur ) •
While the evidence is far from clear it appears that if in a given situation
a "conservative" social norm exists then group decisions will tend in that
direction. Further it appears from earlier work (Clarkson and Tuggle, 1966)
that the experimental environment employed in this research evokes a con-
servative norm in subjects• As a result, for any pair of subjects, the model
selects whether A or B is to be the leader on the basis of the conservative-
n
ness of their decision rules. Whether this rule is sufficient to account
for the leader or dominance role for all pairs of subjects can only be deter-
mined by an examination of the test data. That it was observed to hold in
previous research is an interesting fact• It does not establish, however,
whether the conservative norm, if it exists, comes from a small, subject
sub-culture or is more widely shar_.
e Th___eExperimental Environment
Before describing the experimental task it would appear to be useful
to recapitulate briefly the main propositions that are to be submitted to
L /
test. _-J For to test each hypothesis certain observations must be generated
by the experiment. A note will be made of these requirements as the proposi-
tions are discussed.
4_/ The tests as well as the procedures involved are presented in detail in
Chapters III, IV and V.
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The principal hypothesis which has motivated this research is
that a group's decision behavior with respect to a task can be explained
from a knowledge of the decision processes of its individual participants.
To test this hypothesis the experiment must provide data on the decision
procedures of each subject with respect to the task prior to their taking
part in a group decision. For a knowledge of a subjectJs decision behavior
in a given task must be acquired before predictions about group behavior
are made, if these predictions are to have any empirical content -- i.e.
are to be capable of being disconfirmed. Accordingly, whatever task is
chosen, it is clear that each subject must perform samefor a certain
number of trials to provide evidence of his decision behavior with respect
to the task. A number of trials is required in order to produce sequen-
tially linked behavior. As has been noted by _ther investigators 3 e.g.
Bruner3 Goodnowand Austin:
"If behavior is to be viewed as strategy, the task of
analysis can only be accomplishedby devising experi-
ments that can get a lot of sequentially linked be-
havior out of the organism where it can be observed."
(1958,p. 24B)
A second factor underlying this study is the desire to test the
second postulate of invariance -- namely, to determine whether it is
_v___ _^_ e_-_lain a group's decision behavior by means of an adaptive
theory of individual decision-making. To provide the requisite test data
the experiment must be designed so that the decision processes of both
individuals and groups can be readily elicited. Further_ the data must
be such that it can be discovered whether a theory that is sufficient to
account for each subject's behavior is also sufficient to account for the
resulting behavior of the group. A single or "one-shot" group decision
on a specific task would not provide the desired data. The experiment must
- 19 -
also consist of a number of group trials on the same task that was used
earlier. For 3 if an individual theory is able to account for the sequen-
tially linked behavior of both individuals and groups 3 then it would appear
................ ._,.,_u_m_,_ u.,. _L_vmrlunce has some empirical support.
To test the propositions that account for interpersonal influence
some record is required of what each subject would like to do on each trial
before a group decision is made. That is to say, if one had a record of
each individual's private decision prior to the public announcement of same,
then the effect of differences within the group on the subsequent behavior
of each individual can be more accurately measured. Consequently, it would
seem to be desirable to arrange the experimental procedure so that each
individual writes down his decision in private before group discussion on
that trial begins. Once there is a record of each individual's decision as
well as the group's it is up to the hypotheses on influence to account for
any changes in behavior that take place.
If one assumes that interpersonal influence takes place in a sequence
of group trials, then at the end of same the decision processes of at least
one individual will have changed. Or in terms of the model, if one compared
the decision nets of an influenced subject from before and after the group
trials 3 there would be some observable differences. Given these alterations
it is then interesting to raise the question of whether this subject will
continue, if permitted to make decisions by himself again, to exhibit influ-
enced behavior. Putting the question another way: Will the decision net that
represents his '_efore" or "after" behavior more closely account for his
post-group decision behavior? To provide the data necessary for the resolu-
tion of this query a third sequence of trials similar to the first is
required.
- 20 -
A. Experimental Task and Procedure
Experiments used in the development and testing of decision
theories are frequently divided into two types: (1) those that
e.1 "lr.'l+. _.I,_"-'4,', r ..'l,.,,,l-l.. ....
................ _, _,_ be _ccounted zor by static theories, and
(ii) those which require dynamic theories to account for the observed
behavior (Edvards, 1962). Though the distinction between these two
types is not always clear -- a static theory can account for stationary
states within a dynamic theory -- the experimental environments requir-
ing dynamic theories can themselves be separated into two classes
(Rapoport, 1966). The first contains experimental tasks where a sub-
ject's decisions do not affect the outcomes he is presented with.
Forced choice tasks as are used in experiments on probability learning
(Estes, 1959) and information seeking (Edwards, 1962) are examples of
this sort. The second class consists of tasks in which a subject's
decisions can and do affect the experimental outcomes he receives.
Problem solving tasks where outcomes are dependent upon a subject's
reaction to his environment are exemplars of same. The task used in
this study belongs to the second category.
B. Method
To produce the data mentioned above tbp ,.xp_iment is ;_--_=.......
three stages. In the first part (_ I) two subjects, after suitable
instruction 3 are asked to perform the task by themselves. A complete
record is kept of each S's decisions and the experimental outcomes he
receives. At the end of Stage 1 both S's are brought together and are
requested to perform the task as a group. Group decisions are to be
mutually agreed upon. During the group decision phase (Stage 2_) a record
is kept not only of the group's discussion, decisions, and outcomes, but
- 21 -
also of esch S_'s decision that he makes, privately, every trial,
before announcing same to his colle_gue. The third part (Stage _)
is similar to the first in that S's perform the task once more in
isolation from one another.
Thirty students drawn from the Graduate School of Industrial
Administration and the senior class of undergraduates in Engineering
at the Carnegie Institute of Technology were used as S_'s.5_/ No
control was exercised when pairing S's into groups as to whether
the individuals knew each other well or not. However, graduates
were never paired with undergraduates and vice versa. Nor were other
controls exercised over the selection of S's. S's were recruited on
m
a volunteer basis with graduates being compensated for their time at
an hourly rate.
The lack of control over the selection of S's was a deliberately
chosen policy. For, if one takes the theory under test seriously,
it states that a group's decisions can be predicted so_ylf_om_a
knowledge of the individual decision processes involved. Status
variables were eliminated as much as possible by pairing S's accord-
ing to the class they were in. But it was a part of the empirical
test to see if the remaining social variables could be ignored and
still be able to account for a group's decision behavior.
_/ Forty subjects were processed through the experiment, but in five
groups (pairs of S's) st least one member chose to ignore parts of
the instructions, thus making the group's data worthless. These
date were discarded.
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C.
The experiment was conducted within the Behavioral Science
Laboratory of the Graduate School of Industrial Administration at
the Carnegie Institute of Technology.
Apparatus
For the entire experiment S's are seated on either side of a
large table. (See Figures 3a and 3b). This table is divided,
lengthwise, and has a moveable partition that is placed between the
two halves. When in its highest position the partition prevents
S's from seeing one another. The partition is placed in this posi-
tion during Stages 1 and _ (Figure 3a). It is lowered to a second
position during Stage 2_ (Figure 3b). An additional partition which
remains in place throughout all three phases separates the experi-
menter who sits at one end of the table from both S's who are at
either side.
/- _3:_ '-
Experimental Apparatus
J f
Figure 3a Figure 3b
Each S has a special form in front of him upon which he writes his
decisions. These forms are passed to E for scoring, and then back to the
S once every trial. KeaQe_ the distance between E and each S has to be
such that the handing back and forth can be readily carried out. During
Stages i and 3 S's are isolated from one another and no talking is per-
mitted. In _ 2_ they are allowed by the partition to see eacl__ther
and to communicate freely. The partition is not lowered completely, however,
as each S records his private decision on the form in front of him before
discussion begins. Neither S must be able to see the contents of the
Do
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other's form. It is this line of vision that determines the height
of the partition during _ 2--.
The remaining equipment includes the data forms themselves, a
microphone; and a tape recorder w_th which to re_ord the dlgaussion
that takes place in Stage 2-.
Task and Procedure
The experimental task is an adaptation of one that was used
originally in studies of individual problem solving behavior
(Pounds, 1964). More recently it was employed in initial research
on group decision behavior (Clarkson and Tuggle, 1966). The task
requires S's to make a sequence of bids -- i.e. decide upon a series
of prices -- in two separate and independent markets.
At the beginning of the experiment the two S's, seated on either
side of the table as in Figure 3a, are presented with a form (data
sheet), b_ which contains two numbered columns of blank spaces.
(See Figure 4). The only exception is in the first row. Here two
prices are entered, one for each market, and circles are drawn around
them denoting that both bids have won. Instructions that describe
the task sre then read to the S's. They contain, in brief, the .....ii
6_ Examples of the data sheets used in all three Stages are provided
in Appendix.
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Excerpt from a Data Form
Trial No. Decision Decision
2
3
4
5
Figure 4
following points :_/
A trial consists of making two bids in terms of dollars and cents,
one for each market. The bids are to be entered on the blank spaces pro-
vided on the data sheet• S's are informed that the markets are competi-
tive and that they are bidding against two series of prices which reflect
this situation• In addition they are told that the actual market prices
against which they are bidding are recorded on a sheet which E has in
m
front of him.
A "win" is achieved by submitting a bid that is lower on that market
than the corresponding price on E's list• Either one or both bids can win
m
on any given trial. At the end of each trial S's are asked to hand in
their forms to E. He compares their bids against his prices for that
trial, and marks which have '_on" and which have "lost" by drawing a circle
around those that won. E then passes the scored forms back to the S's.
Thus, S's are informed of the outcomes of their bids at the end of each
trial.
_/ The complete set of instructions that are used before each Stage are
given in Appendix.
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It is suggested to S's that they think of themselves as earning
profits in proportion to the numerical value of their winning bids. Further,
they are asked to regard the sumof such profits over a series of trials as
a mc_o_ v_ _ performance in the experiment. They are asked to make
their decisions in such a way as to maketheir "performance earnings" as
large as possible.
Thoughthere is no limit on the prices S's can choose, there are
two important limitations on their bidding:
i) They are required to alter one, and only one, of their
bids on each trial. They can changewhich one they wish,
but one price must changeand one must remain unchanged
for that trial.
ii) All alterations in bids are to be madeby adding or sub-
tracting $O.15 from the price to be changed.
These are the points covered by the general instructions. Before
proceeding to those read prior to each Sta_ a modest digression is due
on the method by which E scores wins and losses on _S's data sheets. E_2
as mentioned in the instructions, does in fact have a list of numbers,
one for each market, in front of him. Further he also complies with the
instructions and compares, trial by trial, the prices submitted by each
S against the corresponding prices on his list. Prices that are lower
than his are declared wins and he draws a circle around them in the
prescribed manner. The part that differs from what S's are told is that
E's numbers are not drawn from a list of bids produced by some other
market. Instead, the two lists are generated by independent draws from
a normal distribution with a mean of $2.00 and a standard deviation of
$0.50. Though the choice of moments is arbitrary, it should be noted
that in previous research (Pounds, 1964; Eglinton, 1965) various means and
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standard deviations were employedwith no noticeable effect observed in
S's decision behavior. The increment of $0.15 (noted above) was chosen
to makechanges in bid prices fit in with these moments. And3 as is
mentioned in the instructlons 3 S's are started off with an opening bid
of $2.00 (the distribution mean) on each market. (See Figure 4). _
As soon as S's have declared that they understand what has been said
m
so far and are ready to proceed, the instructions for Stage _lare read.
They are as follows:
"The first part of the experiment consists of 35 trials or
pairs of bids. Subject to the restrictions mentioned
before, you can bid in any manner you choose. But do not
forget that your objective is to make your performance
earnings as large as possible.
"To indicate the approximate dollar value of the markets an
opening bid of $2.00 on both markets as well as whether
they won or lost, is provided on your form. Your task is
to decide upon which bid to change for the next trial, and
so on for the remaining trials.
"After you have made your decision on each trial hand your
form to me so that I can mark whether your bids have won
or not.
"If there are no questions you can begin."
At the end of Sta_ 1 S's hand in their completed data sheets. They are
invited to remain seated and take a short break before going on to the next
_. No talking has been allowed since the last instruction was read,
but once the partition is lowered to its second position (Figure 3b)
S's are free to communicate with one another. During the short interval
(two minutes) E turns on the tape recorder and presents S's with a new data
sheet. This sheet differs from the previous one in that there is one column
of blank spaces headed M_ Decision and another beside it headed Group Decision.
(See Figure 5)-
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Excerpt from Group Data Form
Trial No. M_ Decision Trial No. Group Decision
2 2
3 3
4 4
• • • • •
• • • • •
Figure 5
The first pair of bids under the Group Decision column has the starting
prices of $2.00 filled in plus whether these bids have won or lost• The
instructions for Stage _2 are as follows:
"Both of you have now made bids for 35 trials2 In this
part of the experiment you are to bid together for a
sequence of 30 trials•
"You will notice that the form for this part of the
experiment differs slightly from the one you were Just
using• On all trials 3 each of you is to write down what
bids you would like to make under the column My Decision•
You will then tell each other what you have written down
and proceed to reach an agreement on what bids to make.
The bids you agree upon are to be recorded by each of
you on your form in the usual way under the column
Group Decision. Both of you will then hand in your sheet
so that I can draw circles around the winning contracts.
Since both of you will kno_ whether the group's bids have
won or lost, there is to be no talking at the beginning
of a trial until each of you has written down what you want
to do next.
"You are playing on a continuation of the same market, and
all bidding rules are the same as before•
"If there are no questions, you can begln."
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At the end of _ _2the completed data sheets are collected and
there is another short break. (two minutes). During this period, the
tape recorder is shut off and the partition is raised to its former posi-
tion (Figure 3a). Forms identicsl to those used during Stage i are handed
out with the first trial filled in with the $2.00 bids and their outcomes.
It is worth noting at this point that the experimenter uses a different
series of randomnumbers3 drawn from the samepopulatlon_ for each market
as well as each Stage. Hence, though the data sheets always have opening
bids of $2.00 in each market, whether they are wins or losses changes for
each Sts__. In particular, S's begin Stage I with a win on both $2.00
bids, _ 2_with a win on the left and a loss on the right for the first
group bid, and Stage 3 with a loss on the left and a win on the right.
The instructions for Stage _ are as follows:
"The final part of the experiment consists of your bidding
by yourselves for 30 trials.
'You are playing on a continuation oZ the same market and
the bidding rules are the same as before.
"If there are no questions, you can begin."
To recapitulate, the recorded decision behavior at the end of the
experiment consists of the following: On sll trials in Stages I and _ for
each S there are two prices stated in dollars and cents with the appropriate
marks as to whether these bids won or lost. In Stage 2_ on each S's form
there are two columns of prices 3 the first records the private decision taken
before group discussion, the second being the agreed upon group bids. Only
the group's bids are scored for wlns and losses.
The experiment was designed to meet certain criteria. The first is
that it produce sequentially linked decision bahvior. It is clear that the
quantity of such behavior which can be generated in this experiment is limited
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only by the willingness of S's and the general constraints of time and money.
m
The second point to note is that task outcomes, the wins and losses 3 are
in part determined by the _. During Stage_ S's quickly learn that to
raise price_ iacreuses the likellaood of a loss and vice versa. Furthermore,
there is no bounded set of strategies which can be called "correct." Any
method of choosing bids will satisfy the general requirements. Though not
all decision rules are equally rewarding in a monetary sense, S's are free
to behave as they see fit. Lastly 3 it was desired to obtain data on group
decision-making where concurrently data were available on each individual's
decision behavior with respect to the same task before 3 after 3 and during
the group decision phase. Stages l__ _ and _ of the experiment generate
these data.
Chapter II
Model of the Group Decision-Mskin_Process
From the description of the experimental procedure it should be
apparent that the primary objective of this research is to be able to
explain the data generated during Stage_ from a knowledge of the individual
behavior exhibited in Stage!. (The data of Stage_ are used to test the
permanence of such alterations in individual decision processes as take
place in the group decision phase. This test, while interesting, is of
secondary importance. Accordingly, both data and tests pertaining to the
third Stage are treated later on in Chapter V).
The model that is proposed to account for Sta__ behavior is quite
straightforward and states: The behavior of a group is s direct conse-
quence of the interaction of the decision processes of its participants.
In other words, given a model of each S's decision behavior -- i.e. a
statement of the decision rules that are capable of reproducing the behavior
exhibited in Stage! -- a group's behavior is an end product of the inter-
action of these two collections of decision processes. Accordingly, the
model of a group's decision behavior is composed of one model for each S
n
in the group. Since this study is concerned exclusively with the behsvln_
of dyads, the group model consists of two individual models each of which
represents the behavior of one particular S.
In order to explicate the inner workings of the individual model
it is necessary to define clearly each term and mechanism that is used.
The first item of importance is what is_!meant by the observable behavior
itself.
Both an individual's and a group's decision behavior consists of
- 31 -
- 32 -
the sequence of events which is recorded on their forms in Sta6es 1 and 2_.
An example of each is provided in Figure 1. If one recalls the bidding
instructions -- to wit 3 opening bids of $2.00 on each market are provided 3
only one price can be altered per trial 3 and changes in bids are to be made
in increments of $0.15 -- all changes in bids can be readily abstracted
into the following four responses: Increase the Left market (IL), Increase
the Right market (IR), Decrease the Left market (DL), and Decrease the
Right market (DR). Thus 3 any sequence of bids can be transformed into a
sequence of responses that represent the changes that took place 3 as
in Figure 2.
Example of an S's bidding behavior in Stage 1
Trial No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Decision
2.15
m
w
Decision
2.00
m
2.00
1.85
1.85
1.85
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Trial No.
i
2
3
4
5
6
Y
e
Example of an S's bidding behavior in Sta_ 2
M_ Decision
2.00 1.85
, , , , ,
1.85 1.85
1.70 1.85
1.7o 2.oo
1.7o 2.15
1.85 2.15
@
@
Trial No.
i
2
3
4
5
6
7
@
Group Decision
2.00
1.85
I
Q
2.00
m
Q
Fi_,_ i
Response Sequence for an S's Stage 1 Bids
Trial No. Decision Decision Response Sequence
2 2.15 2.O0 IL
5 _ 1.85 DR
• • • @
Figure 2
An S's behavior can therefore be described in terms of the responses he
makes to the particular situations he finds himself in. Accordingly, for
every trial -- i.e. every market situation (outcome on both markets)
encountered in the 30 trials -- a group's decision behavior consists of
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the response made by each S_ plus the response decided upon as their collec-
tive choice. It is these three sequences of responses that are taken by
the model as the behavior to be explained.
Huving defined what constitutes the observable data it is now
time to present the model and all its constituent parts. To describe a mod-
erately complicated model, however, presents a number of difficulties. For
the Interrelatedness of many of the processes makes a neat, item by item
explication hard to impose upon the model as well as awkward for the reader
to follow. Similarly, flow charts of major decision processes, while
informative# are only a partial answer to the problem of how to communicate
the way in which a model behaves. Manifestly, the actual computer program
that describes a model in complete detail is the least informative to the
untutored reader. For 3 unless the reader has expert knowledge both of
the computer language used and of the structure of the processes described,
the program itself provides an overwhelming enumeration of particulars
out of which it is exceedingly difficult to make coherent sense. Neverthe-
less, the program is the model; It is the empirical interpretation of the
theory. And if the contents of the theory are to be properly understood
the vehicle (model) by which it is empirically specified must also be intelli-
gible. To assist in the comprehension of the model the discussion of each
component will begin with a brief restatement of the relevant part of the
theory. This will be followed by a description of the model's interpreta-
tion of these statements. Diagrams, flow charts, and examples will be used
with moderate frequency in an endeavor to help clarify the prose.
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i. The Basic Postulates
The main postulates of the model are derived from earlier informa-
tion processing theories of individual behavior. 1-/ That postulates about
individual behavior are appropriate for a model of group behavior should
be readily apparent from the discussion in the previous section. The
theory of group decision-maklng that is proposed here is a theory of in-
dividual behavior which can account for interpersonal relations. Since
this research is concerned with dyads 3 the model of a group contains two
individual models. Hence, the postulates of the group model are those
that form the basis for the model which represents an indivldual's decision
behavior when acting as a member of a group.
_-..,- _,,,.,_,-.,. v_ 6.Lv_ ,_J.oJ.v_A behav oi _ pv_-u_ t,&L_u _Q:_ U_C_D_I" curt
be represented as having:
l) A memor Y that contains information on the actual prices
bid and the outcomes obtained for all past trials during
a particular Stage in the experiment. Since each S has
these data in front of him on his form, to represent the
model's memory as having this information available to it
does no violence to the actual situation.
l_/ These postulates were first stated by Newell, Shaw & Simon (1958)
and subsequently have been employed in the construction of a number
of theories (e.g. Feigenbaum, 1963; Simon and Kotovsky, 1964;
Clarkson, 1962; Reitman, 1965). The postulates as applied to the
model of group behavior were investigated by E_lihgton (1965).
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2) Searc______hand Selection procedures that are capable of
examining the contents of memory -- i.e. looking back
over previous trials -- in order to generate the values
of the attributes required at that time by the decision
processes.
3) A se__tof rule_____sand criteria that guide the decision-
making process by stipulating when and how each decision
process is to be used or sltered. This set of rules is
divided into two parts:
(i) A structure of decision processes (discrimination
nets) that permits the model to generate responses
_u pai%i_ia_ _nvironmentai conul_lons -- l.e. tae
decision processes that transform stimulus inputs
into bidding responses.
(ii) A Monitor that has its own decision rules and criteria
which specify the conditions under which the discrim-
ination nets themselves are to be mltered as a conse-
quence of novel stimuli or interpersonal differences.
The Monitor controls the growth and collapse of the
Although it might, at first, seem reasonable to discuss the model's specifi-
cation of these postulates in the order given above, the empirical inter-
pretation of the first two is dependent upon the processes delimited in
the third• In short, a complete specification of the Monitor and the struc-
ture of the decision nets defines, to a large extent, both the required con-
tents of the memory and the processes to be used in search and selection.
Accordingly, these items will be treated in the reverse order.
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2. The Monitor
The Monitor's task is, in essence, to attend to the environment,
which in the group situation includes the behavior of the other S as well as
the responses being produced by the decision processes under its own control.
When, according to its criteria, the decision rules are not behaving in a
satisfactory manner the Monitor effects the requisite alterations. How and
by what procedures such changes are made as well as what constitutes the
Monitor's criteria are the subjects of this section.
In order to describe how a discrimination net is altered by the Monitor
it is necessary to have some idea of what these nets are llke. Although it is
the function of the next section to explicate the genesis and development of
each S_'s decision rules, a rudimentary description of their structure and form
If one reflects upon the experimental task for a minute it is apparent
that all pairs of bids generate four possible classes of outcomes -- a Win on
both markets (WW), a Win on one market and a T.oss on the other (W___L or L___W),
or a Loss on both markets (L___L). Thus, the immediate stlmulus-situation at
the end of each trial can be represented by the four attributes, _ _
L___L Accordingly, an S_'s responses to these stimuli can be represented as the
end result of passing down the particular branch of a net which has the stlm-
_-__uL_ a_ a top level node or test. in Figure 3, a very simple net is
presented in which these four situation attribu_im are the only tests applied
to the input information. Each node has a positive and a negative branch.
Hence, depending upon the situatimn that prevails on a given trial (e.g. the
input information) the net will sort this information to one of four classes
of responses. Though the responses attached to each node in Figure 3 are not
all single valued, they can be made so by the addition of further attributes
(discriminators). Two such attributes might be '_as the previous bid change
- 38 -
A simple Decision Net
INPUTS
!
+ _ WW (Both Sides Win?)
Increase the bid (
in either market | __
k_
+_ WL (Win on Left, Loss on Right?)
I Decrease the Right I _
I market bid 1 -
__W (Loss of Left, Win on Right?)
I ecrease themarket bid
left
Decrease the bid
in either market
(Loss on Both?)
Error i
Stop
Figure 3
" B9 -
made on the left market?" and 'Was the previous bid change an increase in
price?" Representing these two attributes by the symbols S_/L and _C.
respectively 2 and the set of possible responses by _ _ DL and DR the
net in Figure B can be altered to that of Figure h.
A Simple Decision Net Expanded
INPUTS
• +
Error IStop
Figure 4
The net in Figure 4 not only has a unique set of responses attached
to the terminal nodes, but it also makes a more detailed examination of the
input information. For in the W W condition it now states that the stimulus-
situation consists of a win on both markets plus whether the last bid change
was made on the left market. Similarly the stimulus-sltuation for LL is the
market state of losses on both markets plus whether the last bid change was
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an increase. Manifestly 3 for a given market state a larger range of responses
can be provided for by adding still further nodes to the net.
Consider 3 for example, the part of the net given in Figure 5. Here
the stimulus-situation that leads to a response of an Increase in the Left
market bid is given by the conjunction of having increased the bid on the
left market on the previous trial and by having the outcome of thls bid be
a win on the left and a loss on the right.
Part of Net Showin6 Multiple Nodes
Figure 5
In Chapter I it was stated that changes in behavior due either to
learning or interpersonal influence were to be represented by alterations
to decision nets. Such a procedure implies that the Monitor has to be able
to add nodes to accommodate new responses. To make such additions the Monitor
requires a mechanism which will provide it with suitable attributes. Hence 3
a brief discussion is due on the attributes themselves.
- 41 -
(a) The Attributes:
Whenthe Monitor decides thst the behavior of a particular decision
net is unsatisfactory it alters sameby adding a new node and response to
as intended, the node itself must represent a relevsnt portion of the
stimulus-situation. For, if in Figure 5 the In__£ node had been an S_/L_ node
such that there were now two of these nodes in sequence, the resulting defin-
ition of the stimulus-situation would be absurd. In brief, a mechanism is
needed which permits the Monitor to classify the actual market situation in
terms of relevant attributes. _
The model solves this problem by providing the Monitor with a specific
list of possible attributes. These attributes are organized in an hypothe-
sized noticing order. That is to say, the attributes (described below) are
placed on the Monitor's list in the order in which it is hypothesized S's
will notice these characteristics of the market situation. The attributes refer
to three classes of events: i) The current state of both markets in terms of
wins and losses, (ii) the nature of the previous change in bid, and (iii)
the sequential nature of the outcomes of several prior trials. These attri-
butes, with the symbols by which they will in future be referred to, are listed
in order as follows:
Current Market State Atrributes
Win on Left and Win on Right
Win on Left and Loss on Right
Loss on Left and Win on Right
Loss on Left and Loss on Right
WW
w
WL
I
LW
LL
m
For further discussion on the classification of inputs see: J. B. Bruner
"On Perceptual Readiness, " Psychological Reviewp Vol. 64, 1957, PP. 123-52.
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Previous Change Attributes
Side of previous change 3 Left S/L
Direction of previous change 3 Increase Inc.
Relative size of bid on leftvs, right, L_ R R.B.S.
Sequential Market State Attributes
Consecutive Wins on the Left Ws/L
Consecutive Wins on the Right Ws/R
Consecutive Losses on the Left Ls/L
Consecutive Losses on the Right Ls/R
Of this llst the only members which have not yet been described are the
Relative Bid Size attribute and those dealing with Consecutive Wins or Losses.
The former is a relevant characteristic of the market situation when the
bid price on one market is greater than that of the other. Once it is a part
of a discrimination net it will permit the node to branch positively if the
left price is greater or equal to the right market price.
Consecutive wins or losses exist when three or more of the same out-
comes have occurred in sequence, including the most recent, on either of the
markets, provided that the other market does not have an equally long or longer
run of the same outcome. For the list of outcomes given below it is clear that
there is a run on wins on the left. Thus_ _f the Monitor
WL
WW
WW
WL
attempted to discover whether Ws/L was a relevant attribute of the current
trial the answer would be, Yes. The same would be true of Ls/L if the wins were
replaced by losses. However, if the list of outcomes was given by
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LL WW
WW LL
or
WW LL
WW LL
none of the Sequential Market State attributes would be relevant.
(b) The Criteria
It has already been mentioned a number of times that the Monitor's
function is to adjudge the behavior of the discrimination nets under its con-
trol. To do so it requires sufficiency criteria which will indicate when al-
terations are to be made. In order to describe the criterla 3 however 3 a further
discussion of the properties of S's decision rules in this task is required.
Revert back, for a minute, to the decision net shown in Figure 4.
If this net in fact represented someone's decision behavior 3 and if this
behavior never changed over a long sequence of trials, then It would be
possible to compute the long run frequency of wins or losses such a net would
generate. For in W__WWsituations it will raise a bid and in all other cases
lower one. And since the increment is constant and outcomes are determined
by s comparison with numbers drawn from a normal distribution of given mean
and variance 3 the long run frequency of wins can be computed as follows:
Let the probability of a win on one of the bids per trial be given by
P. i_nen it is t2e case that:
p2 = 2 [(P(1 - P)I] + (l-P) 2
The solution of this equation is P = .71. Accordingly, for the decision net
of Figure 4 we would expect it to generate approximately 70_ wins in any long
series of trials.
It follows from the analysis that it is possible to compute the fre-
quency of wins expected from any stable decision net. A corollary of this
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result is that the frequency of wins produced by an S's decision processes
in this experimental environment is an important summary characteristic of
his discrimination net.
This finding is supported b_ a variety n#" exp=erimental evidcncc T_
earlier research within a roughly similar environment 3_/ it was demonstrated
that one could effect significant changes in an S's decision processes as well
as his bid prices by altering the method by which the win-loss outcomes are
generated. If S's are presented with a task as given in Stase l, and if after
30 trials the experimenter now selects outcomes on the basis of a randomized
list of wins and losses with a given frequency of wins, then by the appropriate
selection of the win frequency S_'s can be made to raise their bids, leave their
bids more or less as they are, lower their bids, or lower their bids and alter
the way in which they choose their bids. The controlling variable is the
correspondence between the frequency of wins generated by S_'s when bidding
against actual numbers and the frequency of wins provided by the randomized
list of outcomes. If these two frequencies are approximately the same S's are
unable to detect the change that has taken place. If the frequency of wins
provided by the experimenter is greater than that previously experienced, S's
raise their bid prices in what appears to be an effort to keep the proportion
of wins roughly constant. Conversely, if a lesser proportion of wins is pro-
vided by the experimenter, S's lower bids. Moreover, if such behavior does
not produce the desired level of wins, S's become noticeably upset and may
cease to bid altogether or begin trying out radically different methods of
3_/ A detailed discussion of the experimental findings is presented in
P. G. Eglington, op. ci___t.
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generating bids.4_ Manifestly 3 this is not the first time that it has been
observed that S_'s are sensitive to changes in frequencies of rewards in
experimental environments. _/
The Monitor incoroorste_ t.h_= _,_o_o _ S's .... _--_--
frequency in the following hypotheses:
(i) S's attend to the frequency of wins generated by their
decision processes.
(ii) The frequency of wins obtained by each S during the
latter trials of Sta$e 1 is an estimate of the long run
proportion of wins that would be generated by these nets
if sufficient trials were permitted.
(ii$) Each S_ during Stage 1 develops a concept of what is an
acceptable level of wins.
(iv) Significant alterations in the actual proportion of wins
are responded to by making suitable changes in the decision
nets.
As will be seen in a moment, these hypotheses are sufficient to permit the
Monitor to regulate the behavior of its decision nets. Whether these hypo-
theses are adequate representations of S_'s behavior can only be determined
by empirical test -- a subject to which Chapters III and IV are devoted.
4_/ It should be noted that each of these effects can be produced on each
market as well as on both taken together. In brief, one market's
price can be made to rise while the other is lowered.
5_/ See for example: Bruner, Goodnov & Austin, (1957, P. 189)
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The Monitor turns these hypotheses into working mechanisms in the
following manner. First, the actual frequency of wins obtained by an S in
the last ten trials of Sta6e 1 is computed for each market. This proportion
is called the Monitor Freauencv for each market. Second. the actual proportion
of wins obtained by the group's bids is computed to yield a measure called the
Actual Frequency for each market. The Actual Frequency is generated by examin-
ing the outcomes of the last five trials only. It is always updated and is in
effect a moving proportion. 6-/ Third 3 a significant alteration in the actual
proportion of wins occurs when the Monitor Frequency differs from the Actual
Frequency by 20_ or more in either direction -- i.e., a significant alteration
is defined by
IMonitor Frequency I -- I ActualFrequency I _ 0.20
An example. Suppose that subject A_'s Monitor Frequencies are 0.8
for the left market and 0.5 for the right. That is to say, in the last ten
trials of State 1 his record of wins is eight on the left and five on the
right. Suppose further that the sequence of group bids and outcomes for the
first seven trials are as shown in Figure 6. Here, differences exist when
the left are below and the right are above the Monitor Frequency.
During the first five trials of Stage 2 this rule is replaced by one
which begins at the third trial and adds 9n_ each 51_ _tll the
fifth trial is reached.
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Comparison of Actual and Monitor Frequencies
Trial Group Bids
1 2.00 _
2 1.85
3 _ 2.00
4 1.7o (_
5 1.55
6 1.55 @
Actua I Frequenc F
Subject A's
Monitor Frequency
Significant
Difference
•33 .66 .80 .50 Yes No
•25 .75 .80 .50 Yes y_s
.20 .80 .80 .50 Yes Yes
.20 .80 .80 .50 Yes Yes
.40 .80 .80 .50 Yes Yes
Figure 6
If win frequency were the only variable of importance, then the column
of Significant Differences could be used directly as the trigger for whatever
changes are required in the decision nets. However, S's also pay attention
to the actual bid prices themselves. In particular, they appear to develop
a notion of the market "trend ''7_-- i.e. whether the market prices they are
bidding against appear to be rising or falling. Since S's are told that the
markets are independent it is not surprising that S's discriminate between the
apparent trends on the left versus the right market.
To accommodate this observed behavior the Monitor computes a Trend
variable for each market. The determination of a Trend value -- denoted by
a "Yes" or a "No" with a mark as to direction "Up" or "Down" -- does not begin
until the seventh trial° The computation proceeds as follows:
(i) Take the previous seven trials (the number seven is chosen as the hypo-
thesized number of trials an S will look back over to determine trend) and
compute the average prices for the first and last pair of trials, i.e. trials
_/ For further details see P. G. Eglington, op. ci___t.
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I and 2 and trials 6 and 7. Using the data of Figure 63 for the left market
these average prices are $1.975 and $1.475 respectively.
(li) The difference between these two averages is taken and both the
_ w_= _ _igi_ are _oted. in Li_i_ c_ Lh_ vulu_ £s _ .pu.
(iii) Net, the sumof the increments for these trials is computedby adding
the absolute values of these changes. For the data given above the sum of
the increments for the left market is 0.60. (iv) A Tren_____dexists if the
difference determined in (ll) is greater or equal to four-fifths of the value
of the sum of the increments given in (ill). (v) The Tren_____dis Increasing or
Decreasing depending on the sign of the difference in (li). Employing the
numbers noted in (li) and (lii) we see that _ .50 _ (.8)(.60). Accordingly,
on the left-hand market in Figure 6, at the seventh trial there is a
Decreasing Trend.
Note, that if the left bid on trial seven had been equal to or
greater than 1.55, then the result of the above computation would have been
N__oTrend. An example of a N_2oTrend is provided by the bids in the right
market. If the reader wishes to test the sensitivity of the Trend computation
he will quickly see that the key lles in the difference between the average
of the first and last pairs of bids. For unless this difference is great
enough, _ignlfy!_ _ steady change of price in one direction, four,fifths
of the sum of the increments will be greater than this difference.
The Monitor employs the values of the Trend variable to modify the
determination of differences between Monitor and Actual Frequencies. Though
significant differences may well exist, as in Figure 6, the value of the
Trend variab_ can nullify these differenceso To understand the operation of
this procedure it must be remembered that the Monitor's function is not only
to determine when changes in the decision nets are required but also to
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specify the alterations to be made. Accordingly3 differences between
Monitor and Actual Frequencies and Trend values are denoted in terms of
the decision net's responses that are inappropriate under the given condi-
tion. Ina_ro_rist_ r__ _o _i_ _r_^_ .......
__ . v _ ............... ._v_. n_nc_# the rules
about to be discussed determine for each S_p on each trial which 3 if any 3
responses would violate the hypothesized schema by which his desired fre-
quency of wins is maintained.
The rules governing the determination of response vi_lations for
each market are as follows: 8_
(i) If Actual Frequency-_Monitor Frequency and Trend is Increasing,
then any response is permissible.
(ii) If Actual Frequency_ Monitor Frequency and there is No Trend or the
Trend is Decreasing, then a Decrease in bid price is a Violation.
(iii) If Actual Frequency = Monitor Fre%uency, then any response is permissi-
ble.
(iv) If Actual Frequency_ Monitor Frequency and Trend is Decreasing 3 then
any response is permissible°
(v) If Actual Frequenc_ _: Monitor Frequency and there is N¢ Trend or the
Tren_____dis Increasing, then an Increase in bld price is a Violation.
To illustrate the behavior of these rules consider the date pertain-
ing to the seventh trial in Figure 6 o For the left market the Actual Frequency
is less than the Monitor Frequency. At the same time, the value of the Tren_____d
variable is Increase. By applying rule (v) it follows that an Increase on
bid price for this trial would constitute s violation. That is to say, the
response IL is considered by the Monitor to be a violation. On the right
market, however, the Actual Frequency is greater than the Monitor Frequency
Sinme there is N__o_ rule (ii) applies and the response DR is declared
8_/To be significant differences in frequencies must be _ 20_.
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a violation. Clearly, if the Trend value had been Increase# then either
of the responses JR or DR would have been permissible.
The model keeps track of these procedures by placing the values of
these variables on lists which are _art of the Monito_ for esch S. __%_e
relevant values are computed each trial so that during group decision trials
each S's Monitor has a Monitor Frequenc 7 List_ an Actual Fre_uenc [ List, a
Trend List and a Violation List_ on which the appropriate values are recorded
for the left and right markets. They are the values of the variables which
when conjoined with the decision rules define the criteria employed by the
Monitor to adjudge the responses produced by its discrimination net.
(c) Learning, Self-lnfluence I and Chan6in6-0ne's-Mind
In this model all changes in an individual's decision behavior that
are effected to accommodate his own desires are represented by one process --
the Self-Influence Process. It could easily be argued that such alterations
might be more accurately broken down into three processes -- namely, learning,
self-influence and the phenomenon of changing-one's-mind. To treat these
processes separately it would have to be possible to distinguish operationally
the observable behavior indicative of each. As yet it is not clear how to do
this in the context of this experimental environment. As a result, the model
adopts the simplification that all changes induced by an individual upon
himself can be represented by one set of procedures o
Self-influence occurs when the response proposed by an S's decision
for a particular trial is found on his own Violation List. If on trial n
individual A_'s decision net produces a response which is defined by his Monitor
as a violation, then this situation evokes the self-influence process. Such a
sequence of events can take place in Sta6e 2 if the proportion of wins gener-
ated by the group's bids are not in keeping with the criteria of A's Monitor.
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Consider the situation presented in Figure 7 where subjects A and
are considering what bids to make for the tenth trial. The market state
at trial 9 is WL. After processing the information about this trial through
_ i_elev_a_ portion oz 2is decision net A produces the response DR -- i.e.
decrease the right bid for trial lO which implies the bid price of $1.85
on both markets. However 3 the Monitor notices that the response DR is a
violation. For on the right market Actual Frequency_ Monitor Frequency
and Trend is not increasing. Hence 3 the value Decrease is on the Violation
List for the right market. In short 3 the situation is such that although
_'s decision rule suggests the response _ A is represented as be_ngunwill-
ing to make such a move as it would in all likelihood lead to an increase
in the frequency of wins on the right market• The situation _ is trying to
prevent.
Trial
8
lO
Comparison of A's and Group's Responses
Actual Freq.
A's Decision A's Monitor Freq. Group Decision of Group
• o o o o • o •
• o • o o • • •
• o • • o • • e
1.7o e°3o +80 .50 @ @ .80 l.OO
1.85 2.00 .80 .50 G 2.00 .80 °80
Figure 7
The Monitor notices the violation and proceeds to effect a change by
employing the Self-influence procedure. This procedure operates by present-
ing alternative responses to A's Monitor for its consideration. The alterna-
tives themselves are taken from a list of responses that are appropriate for
- 5e
each market state. _/ Thus, for trial i0 the alternative response IL would
be suggested. The Monitor considers such alternatives in the same way it
considers all responses. It examines whether it appears on the Violation
List. If the su_t_a _p_ _ =i ..... -_ .............
and the initial response stands as the one to be made for this trial. If it
does not appear on the Violation List_ then the new response is accepted
and Self-influence takes place to make that response a part of A's decision
net. A flow chart of this procedure is given in Figure 8.
Self-Influence Decision Procedure
I Proposed Response IFor Trial n
_._ Violation List?J
No
!
i Accept I
Proposed Response I
Y_Find Alternative
Response ]
IS Alternative o__n
iolation List?
...._ /
Effect 1Self-influence
Figure 8
9_/ For WW__states the alternative responses are _ IR; for WL__states they are
DR; for LW states they are _ JR; and for LL states they are _ D_RR.
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To effect the Self-influence the new response has to be added to
the relevant part of A's decision net. Such alterations in decision nets
are made by adding a new node plus the required response to the appropriate
_Io_^ , __ ___ i0/ ....
r .......... _ _.-- xo _--ustra_e this procedure consider the decision net
of Figure 4. Suppose, for the moment, that this is the net which represents
A's decision procedure as of the ninth trial in the situation just described.
The response proposed by this net to the market state WL is DR. But A's
Monitor notes that D__Ris a violation and the alternative response I__Lis
proposed. IL does not appear on the Violation List and a change of the
net is required. Such a change is illustrated in the two nets shown side
by side in Figure 9. Notice that the new node S/L is the first relevant node
to appear on the Monitor's attribute list. Notice also that the last group
response (shown in Figure 7) was an IL. Hence, the new response is attached
to the positive branch of the node S_ and the old response D_RR!z _ ;L_ ,_
is attached to the negative branch.
It is also worth noting that these procedures only partially circum-
vent the difficulty which prompted A_ to change his mind. Although he is
represented as wanting to avoid decreasing the right market, it is only an
hypothesis of the model that he _@_ rather increase the left than the
right. The model's decision leads A_; in this situation, to behave as though
he prefers to leave the right market alone rather than decrease the bid any
further. And, since he has to make a bid of some sort, his attention is
caught by the win on the left which is a suitable basis from which to resolve
his dilemma in terms of an increase in the bid price o The suitability of
l_J The rules that govern the addition of nodes are described in detail in
Section 3.
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A's Decision Net Before and After Self-Influence
A's Decision Net at Trial
+
LW
+
+
+ INC
LL
A's Decision Net Self-Influenced
WW
F__mm_a
representing both the dilemma and its resolution in this manner is examined
in Chapter IV which deals with tests on the model's processes.
(d) .Interpersonal Influence and the Dominance Relation
In order to discuss the procedure by which interpersonal influence
is hypothesized to occur it is as well to recapitulate briefly the situation
faced by each S in Stage 2. On each trial S's are instructed to write down
their own decisions before announcing same to their colleague. As was noted
above, it is during the process of making their own private decisions that
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the hypothesized Self-influence process takes place if required. After S's
have written down their bids they tell one another what it is they wish to
do. Manifestly 3 on a particular trial they may both have decided upon the
_o,_ _,_ T_ _-. ....... hyp............ _v_L_ _a_ model o_hesizes that S's will agree to
use these prices for the group's decision. There will be no dispute, and
the group's bid will be identical to the private bids written down by both
SIs.
The more interesting case is when the private decisions of the two
S's do not agree. In this circumstance 3 they can decide to use either one
of the proposed bids for some other pair of prices. Whatever the result
of the group's deliberations it is inevitable that the proposed bid of at
least one S will not be used as the group's bid. If one considers the
acceptance or rejection of a proposed bid as that of the group's in terms
of rewards or the absence of rewBrds, then each S can be represented as con-
trolling, in part 3 the rewards earned by the other. Accordingly, disagreement
between S's as to the group decision defines the situation in which inter-
personal influence may take place.
It is now necessary to recall the discussion on dominance that was
presented in Chapter I. It was noted that research on group decision-making
suggests that on the average groups tend to make riskier decisions than those
made by the individuals themselves. But it was also pointed out that the
risky-conservative nature of group decisions appear to be determined by the
social norms prevalent in the decision situation. In addition, it was men-
tioned that in recent research using an experimental environment similar to
that employed here 3 the relevant norms were conservative in nature -- during
disagreements the more conservative decision was usually chosen as the group's.
Riskiness and conservativeness are defined here in terms of responses
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to given market situations. An individual who raises the wimiing bid in a
WL or LW situation is making riskier decisions than one who decreases the
losing bid. One gross indicator of the risky-conservative nature of a
decision net is its level of bid prices, or what amounts to the same %h!ng_
the frequency of wins produced in Stage i. Nets that generate more increases
will yield bids with higher prices, which in turn will win less often. Thus,
s measure of the conservativeness of 8 decision net is the frequence of wins
it obtains on both markets. Frequency of wins is a useful measure only if
the decision behavior is relatively stable. Accordingly, it would appear
reasonable to use the latter bids of Sta_e 1 as the data for the computation
of %his index.
Since this research is concerned with two person groups, the more
conservative decision-making of any pair is readily determinable. For
each S the model computes the frequency of wins obtained on the last ten
trials of Stage 1 for both markets. This number becomes the value of the
Conservativeness Index for that S. Consequently 3 for any pair of S's the
model compares the values of this index. I-_ The S with the greater value
is the more conservative. It is he who is hypothesized by the model to be
the Dominant member of the group.
The determination of the Dominant S_ is an important step, as the
hypothesized rules which account for interpersonal influence use this char-
acteristic. The interpersonal influence rules are evoked each time S's
disagree on what bid to make for the group. Let two such S's be denoted by
the names A and B2 and let it be understood in the discussion which follows
i__ In the event of a draw the model recomputes the values using the
data of one additional trial at a time until the tie is broken.
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that A and B_ disagree on the group bid. The interpersonal influence rules
are given by:
(i) If B's proposed response does not appear on A's Violation
.... > _,,_, _._ _ _._ _v_J.L_oL_, Lhen B's response is chosen as
the group's decision 3 and an entry recording the market state
(____;_ etc.) on this trial is made on A's Influence List.
If this is the first occurrence of this market state value
on A's Influence List no further action is taken. If there
already is an identical market state value on _'s list, then
a new node with B's response attached to it is added to A's
net in the appropriate place -- i.e. influence is effected on
A. After A's net has been altered the market state values of
this trial is removed from A's Influence List.
appears
(ii) If B's proposed response/on _'s Violation List, and if B is
Dominant, then A__'sresponse is chosen as the group's decision
and an entry recording the market state on this trial is made
on B's Influence List.
If this is the first occurrence of this market state value on
B's Influence List no further action is taken. If there already
is an identical market state value on _B's list, then a new node
with _'s response attached to it is added to B's net in the
appropriate place -- i.e. influence is effected on B. After
m
_'s net has been altered the market state value for this trial is
removed from B's Influence List.
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(iii) If B's proposed response appears on _'s Violation List,
and if _'s proposed response appears on B's Violation List,
and if B is Dominant, then B's response is chosen as the
g_ou_:s _nd no further action is taken -- i.e. no entries
are made on A's Influence List.
To illustrate the behavior of these decision rules consider the
following situation: Both _'s are considering what bids to make for the
tenth trial in the situation presented in Figure 7. Suppose that the
decision behavior of _ and B are represented by the discrimination nets
in Figure 10. The market state at the end of trial nine is WLo And if
the information pertinent to this trial is processed by these nets A
and B's private responses will be IL and DR respectively. Since they dis-
agree the Monitor commences processing of the Interpersonal Influence rules.
If B is the Dominant member of this group (from Figure l0 it is clear that
B's net will lead to more conservative bidding behavior) A's Violation List
is examined to determine whether A will permit the response DR to stand for
the group's decision.
Suppose that DR is acceptable to _. Then the model chooses this
response as that of the group's. Since _ agreed to go along with B__ in this
instance, he is represented as making a note .of this by remembering the t_e
of market situation. That is to say, the model places the symbol WL on a
list attached to _'s Monitor called the Influence List. In so doing the
model first checks to see whether there already is a WL symbol on this list.
If this symbol is not currently on A's Influence List# the model places it
there and then goes on to the next trial. However, if a WL symbol is found
on this list, then this symbol is removed from the list and interpersonal
influence takes place° (Note that this procedure is an implementation of the
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S's Decision Nets at be6innin_ of Trial 10 of FiKure 7
+
A's Decision Net B's Decision Net
+
WL WL
+ -- +
S/L
LW LW
+ +
LL LL
-Error i
Stop I
Figure I0
hypothesis: An individual remembers the type of market situation when dis-
agreement occurs and his response does not become the group's. After two
such instances occur the individual will alter his behavior with respect to
this market situation in an effort to reduce conflict.)
Interpersonal influence is effected by adding a new node to A's
decision net under the WL branch. The inappropriate response 3 IL is placed
on the positive branch. What this part of A's net looks llke is given in
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Figure ll. Throughout this procedure B's net remains unchanged.
A's Decision Net Influenced on WL
\
+ WL
+
.Figure ii
Return, for a moment, to the situation where A and B have Just dis-
covered that they want to make different bids on trial ten. Suppose that
B's response does appear on A's Violation List. In that case the model
examines B's Violation List to see whether A's response can be agreed to
by B. If B has IL on his Violation List# the model chooses B's response as
the group's, and no changes are made to either A or B's decision nets.
However, if B does not have A's response on his Violation List# then A's
response is chosen as the group's. In this event, B's Influence List is
examined for the entry WL. If such a symbol is already there, B's net is
altered as interpersonal influence is presumed to have occurred. If B's
Lis____tdoes not have this symbol on it, then it is placed there to record the
disagreement and the model proceeds to the next trial.
Interpersonal influence 3 then, is hypothesized to occur under the
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above conditions when there is conflict or disagreement between S_'s proposed
responses. A flow chart of the decision sequence is provided in Figure 12.
It should be noted that the model resolves the disagreement s in terms of the
nets and Monitor lists have remained unchanged. One obvious consequence of
these procedures is that disagreements tend to make S's decision nets grow
to become more llke one another. This is a phenomena that is observable in
group behavior. Whether the procedures discussed above account for what is
observed is examined in Chapter IV.
3. The Structure of the Decision Nets
In the discussion of the Monitor's behavior numerous references were
made to the procedures by which new nodes and responses were added to exist-
ing decision nets. It was never specified in any detail how these additions
were effected. Nor was the origin of these nets accounted for -- i.e., what
permits the model to say that a particular decision net represents A's decision
behavior?
a) Rules for Alterin6 Decision Nets Used b_ the Monitor
The Monitor's function_ it will be remembered, is to observe the
proposed responses of its discrimination net s decide whether the Self-
influence and/or Interpersonal Influence _ro_ _ _ _ _+_..6+_ _,_
if so to make the requisite alterations in the net. Each of these influence
procedures provides the new response that is to be attached to the new node.
Hence, the concern at present is solely with the mechanism by which new nodes
get added -- i.e., the mechanisms that control the growth and collapse of the
decision nets.
In order to describe the behavior of the addition and collapse rules
one further item must be recalled; namely, that the Monitor has a list of
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Flow Chart of Group Decision Sequence for B Dominant
Are A and B's responses _
the same for this trial?/
f_oes B's responseh
| appear .On A' s #
)
Use B' e I
as the _,roup's I
Use this response as
Examine relevant Influence
Lis_.___t,effect interpersonal
influence if appropriate,
and proceed to the next
trial
Y_,A VlrlspOnnSeLapp_ar
I IUse A's response as
. the group's
the group's and
proceed to the next
trial
Use B's response
as the group's,
and proceed to the
next trial
Figure iE
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attributes which are provided in an hypothesized noticing order. Suppose
that the group is part way through Stage 2 and A's decision behavior can be
represented by the net given in Figure 10. Suppose further that during the
is to be made in A's net. In particular, suppose that the market situation
is the same as given in Figure 7, and that we are dealing with one of the
influence situations described above.
l) To effect the required change the Monitor examines the list of
attributes in order and selects as the new one to be introduced
the first on the list that is not already a part of the relevant
branch of the net. For example 3 the relevant part of _'s net
before the change takes place is:
WL
2)
The first node on the Attribute List that has not yet been used
on this branch is INC.
The new node is then checked against the current market situation
to determine its appropriateness. The nodes S/L and INC are always
appropriate, since each S is constrained to raise or lower his bid
on the left or right market on every trial. However, the nodes
R.B.S. and those dealing with consecutive wins and losses may not
fit the existing market situation. If the new node is no___tappropriate
it is returned to the Attribute List and the next one in order is tried.
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3) Once an appropriate node is selected it is added to the net by
replacing the faulty response with the new node. The new
response is attached to the relevant branch of the new node --
J-J J. J._ J--,___
and the response that led to this change is attached to the other
branch.
In the example given above, if the new response is DR and the new node
is IN__Cthe alteration is given by:
+ NL
Note that in Figure 7 the group response for the last trial was IL. Hence,
the relevant branch for the new response is the positive one. Accordinglyj
the faulty response is attached to the negative branch and the result is
what is shown directly above.
This rule can be called a "Set rule" as it exclude_ the repeated
use of the same member of the attribute set along a given branch of a net.
If such a set rule was not employed, there would be no way of preventing the
same attribute being introduced over and over again, each time with at least
one new response. The nets that _ould result would exhibit neurotic or
plainly ridiculous behavior. (To digressj for a minute, it would be inter-
esting to investigate whether it is a breakdown ofcsuch a set rule that
would account for the phenomena of fixation and nervous breakdowns which
occur in human and animal subjects when learning in a task is made impossibly
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difficult. ) Since a certain regularity in discrimination nets is required
if the individual is to be represented as perceiving regularities in the
environment#1-_a rule such as the one described must be included to guide
the selection of new nodes.
In the above statement of the rules it is noted that the Attribute
Lis____tis searched for a node that is appropriate to the current market situa-
tion. It is quite possible, however, that this search may be fruitless.
That is to say, none of the remaining, unused attributes are appropriate to
the situation. Or, alternatively 3 the branch in the net under consideration
may have grown to such an extent that each possible node is already repre-
sented. Since an alteration must take place for influence to be effected,
the only way it can be accomplished is to reintroduce the first node that
appears on the Attribute List. This results in the relevant branch of the
net looking something like that shown in Figure 13.
A Branch of a Net Where a Node is Reintroduced
R.B.S.
Figure 13
See, for example, J.S. Bruner_ "On Perceptual Readiness, " op. ci__!t.
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The introduction of the second S/L node is a signal to the Monitor to
collapse this branch of the net back to the first occurrence of the node.
This collapsing procedure represents the rejection of a decision rule or
hypothesis when no further attributes can be found to _ive it empirical
support. This collapse rule can be started as follows:
4) On those instances when the Monitor has to reintroduce
a node in a branch of the decision net3 the branch is
collapsed back to the original node in question. The new
response which led to the addition causing the collapse is
attached to the original node in lieu of the node that was
previously there. An example of this collapsing procedure is
given in Figure 14.
Example of Collapse Procedure When a Node has been Reintroduced
i
R.B.S.
Collapsed Branch_ __
Figure 14
5) An additional difficulty is encountered _hen through the
addition of new nodes and responses s redundant situation
is encountered. Such occurs when two nodes representing
_he same attribute are attached belo_ a third, and when
these two nodes have identical responses. In this case, the
node at the higher level is logically redundant. The col-
lapse rule used here eliminates this redundancy by replacing
the higher level node with either of _he two that came after
it. The remaining twin is also deleted. An example of this
situation is provided in Figure 15.
Example of Collapse Procedure to Eliminate Redundancy
Redundant Branches Collapsed Branc h
Figure 15
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These five rules specify the procedures by which the Monitor
alters an individual's decision net. It is interesting to note that
although the set rule:; was introduced to permit moderately stable
nets to be developed, one consequence of so doing is to introduce a
"consonance" effect. At the same time there are obvious similarities
between the behavior generated by these rules and that denoted by
cognitive "dissonance reduction." In brief, the similarities invite
the speculation that it might be possible to demonstrate that these
rules, or ones like them, are capable of accounting for much of the
behavior presented in research on cognitive dissonance. (e.g.
Festinger, 1957, and 1964). _rnether such might be the case or not,
these rules do appear to implement the main notions underlying hypo-
thesis acceptance-rejection and dissonance reduction behavior.
b) The Origins of S's Discrimination Nets
The principal objective of this research is to demonstrate that group
behavior in Stage 2 can be explained by the model from a knowledge of in-
dividual behavior in Stage 1. To accomplish this objective an adaptive
theory of individual behavior has been proposed which consists for each
individual of a Monitor acting upon its discrimination net. If the group
decision behavior of a specific pair of S's is to be explained, each
Monitor must have under its control a discrimination net that is sufficient
to account for a particular S_'s behavior when he is making decisions by
himself. Unless the discrimination nets employed by the model of a specific
group can account for the behavior of each S prior to the commencement of
the remainder of the model will make scant empirical sense. Thus,
it is now necessary to describe the procedures by which the model of a
group's decision behavior generates the discrimination nets sufficient to
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account for each member's behavior.
The model's task is to develop decision nets that represent the
decision behavior of each S. The only data available are those provided
_ ....... _- - ........ , _,_ _,_x's task can be restated as that
of inferring decisiDn nets from the bidding data exhibited on S's data
sheets from Stage I. One way of accomplishing this inference -- the method
adopted by the model -- is to give the Monitor the task of learning to
mimic the bidding behavior of each S in Stage 1. Since S's are bidding
by themselves the Monitor has no need of its Interpersonal and Self-
influence mechanisms. Rather, it requires an additional process, the
Mimic Procedure# with which it can develop the appropriate decision nets.
The Mimic Procedure used by the model behaves as follows: The
model is started at the first trial of the record of an individual's
Stage 1 behavior. Its task is to predict the first pair of bids made by
the S. But the model has no decision net from which to generate a response.
Hence, the Mimic Procedure is activated and it selects the first node of
the Monitor's Attribute List that is appropriate to the given market situa-
tion. As all S's were presented with a WW on the first trial, the first
appropriate attribute is WW. The next step is to attach to this node the
correct responses. Since the objective is to behave as S has done, the
Mimic Procedure examines S's record and determines what his response was for
this trial. Suppose it was IR. Then, this response is attached to the pos-
itive branch of the node and the response NO -- which means there is no
response -- is attached to the negative branch. Thus, for the first trial
. the decision net would be given by:
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Having completed the first trial the model moves on to the next and attempts
once again to predict S's response. Manlfestly3 unless the outcome of S_'s
first bid is _ and unless his response is _ the model will be unable to
predict correctly.
Suppose that the outcome on the second t rlal is NL and that S's
response is D_RR. The model's predi_tlon is, of course, the response N__O. As
this is not identical to _ the Mimic Procedure is activated once again.
It selects the appropriate attribute and attaches to its positive branch
the desired response yielding a decision net:
+ WW
After completing its work, the Mimic Procedure al_ays hands control
back to the Monitor which in turn proceeds to the next trial. At the begin-
ning of each new trial the Monitor employs the decisimn net to predict S's
actual response. If the prediction is correct no alterations are made 3 and
the Monitor proceeds immediately to the next trial. However 3 if the predicted
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response is not the same as S_S's, the Mimi____£cProcedure adds a new node plus
S's actual response to the relevant part of the net.
To continue with the example, suppose that the outcome for the third
trial is LW and that S's response is DT.. Sl,_ +.h_ n_+. I_ ,i,_hI_ +n _a_.+
this behavior the following addition is made to the net.
WW
The fourth trial is a WW situation and as S's response is l___Rthe net is
able to predict correctly and is left unchanged. Suppose that the fifth
trial is also a WW but that this time S_ responds with IL. Since the net's
prediction for this situation is incorrect the Mimic Procedure adds the first
appropriate node nlns g'g _rt._A1 _q_nn_, _ +h_ ,I_,_I
lowing net:
I i|
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Note that the new response IL is attached to the negative branch of the new
node S/L because S's 18st response was _R. That is to say, the node S/L
asks the question: was the last bid on the left market? Since the answer
is negative that is the branch on which to place the new response.
As the Monitor proceeds through the entire 35 trials instances may
occur which activate the two collapsing rules. In this event the collap-
sing rules a_e_use_ as noted above. Once a collapse rule has been used,
the decision net will behave as though it had "forgotten" some of its early
response patterns. In other words, if the early trials were reprocessed
though the net, it would now make s number of incorrect responses instead
of the correct ones placed there by the Mimic Procedure. Such forgetting
could be ellminat_d....by _ ...._- of mechanisms, but the issue at hand is
whether S's appear to forget their earlier response patterns as well. A
test of this proposition was made (Egllngton, 1965), and it was discovered
that if one forces the decision net to "remember" all response patterns it
becomes unwieldy as well as a poor predictor of S's decision behavior.
Accordingly, the collapse rules are permitted to operate and it is merely
worth noting that the decision nets generated by the end of the thirty-fifth
trial have, as a rule, forgotten a number of earlier response patterns.
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By the end of Stage 1 the model has generated a decision net which
represents the decision behavior of the S in question. An example of such
a net, the one developed from the data of subject J.H., is given in Figure
......... -- _, _ao ou_ aria lag nodes are not in their
expected order. For this to have occurred a collapse such as is represented
in Figure 15 must have taken place.) Thus, before the model begins the task
of explaining the decision behavior of a group it constructs a decision net
for each 8 in this manner. A flow chart of this net building procedure is
provided in Figure 17.
One further point about these nets deserves mention. During Stase 1
some S's appear to learn what it is they wish to do more rapidly than other
S's. In other words, some S_'s seem to acquire satisfactory bidding decision
rules sooner than others. The Mimic Procedure is able to detect such dif-
ferences among S_'s by the simple process of keeping track of the number of
additions that have to be made to keep the growing decision net predicting
correctly. The greater the stability 3 once acquired 3 of an S_'s decision rules
the fewer the number of nodes the net requires to account for the observed
behavior. Accordingly, one would expect to be able to test for an S's decree
of satisfaction with his decision rules by counting the number of incorrect
predictions made by the net over the last fifteen trials of Stage l, if the
Mimic Procedure is stopped at the end of the twentieth trial. Similarly.
one might expect to generate more stable nets if one ignored the first few
trials and began the net growing procedure at the end of the tenth trial,
for example. The object, of course, is to generate decision nets that can
account for an individual's decision behavior in Sta6e 2. How well these
nets perform this task is examined in Chapters III and IV.
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J. H. 's Discrimination Net at the end of Sta_ i
+
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+
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+
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+
+
+
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Figure 16
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The Mimic Procedure (Used Durlng'Stage l)
Begin at Trial i
l
4,
Current TriaI
Does Decision Net • '1Predict S's Response
Correctly?
Find Appropriate new
Attribute, and add
_same plus S's
Response to Decision
Net
1
I Go on to Next |Trial I
I _G° °n to Next I
I Trial I
>
Figure 17
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4. Memory and the Search and Selection Procedures
At this point in the discussion of the model the hypotheses concerning
the contents of memory sho_Id b_ n_1_ _nt _n_ _ +_= _I _ +_
behave as specified, then these processes require that certain information
be made available to them.
The main assumption is that the memory contains the record of bidding
behavior as exhibited on an S's data form as the series of trials unfolds.
In Stage 1 these data constitute the bids and outcomes of each S. During
Stage 2 it is the behavior of the entire group. These items are placed on
lists associated with each S's Monitor.
Manifestly, the Monitor's Attribute List is also a part of the memory.
But note that each attribute specifies the quantity of information it re-
quires. That is to say, all but the attributes dealing with consecutive
wins and losses only require information from the immediately preceding trial.
The Consecutive win and loss attributes can require information from the last
five trlals. And the Trend value computation uses the seven previous trials.
Hence, it is being hypothesized by the model, that most responses are made
as a consequence of the immediate stimulus-situation. The exceptions are
due to the slightly increased horizon required for the noticing of runs of
wins or losses and the continued rise or fall of the bid prices in a partic-
ular market. Consequently, although the entire record of bidding behavior
is eventually at the model's disposal, it restricts its attention almost
exclusively to the immediate stimulus-situation.
The Search and Selection procedures are specified in an analogous
manner. For the Monitor has to be able to determine the appropriateness of
each new node that is added to a net. To perform this operation a small set
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of search and test procedures are required. Moreover, each time a decision
net is used to generate a response the nodes in the net have to determine
whether they branch positively or negatively given the market state at that
trial. Hence, the model contains a set of _rocedur_ tb_+..... _ _ _-
carry out the requisite comparisons and tests.
The only point of note about these procedures is that they are them-
selves developed from the basic information processes that it is hypothe-
sized each individual has at his command. The theory of individual decision
behavior (Newell, Shaw & Simon, 1958) from which this model has evolved
posits the existence of such a set of primitive information processes.
These processes are given an empirical interpretation in the formal computer
language in which the model is stated -- Information Processing Language V
(Newell# e__t_ 1964. ) Though the search and selection procedures are not
themselves intended to represent the ways in which S's search for and select
the information they require, their structure and behavior is a direct
consequence of the basic processes with which the theory of individual de-
cision behavior is endowed°
Chapter IIl
Testln_ the Group Decision Model: Part I
Once a model has been constructed the next step is to subject it
to a series of empirical tests. Unless one can determine how "well" the
model behaves under a variety of circumstances one is unable to comment
upon either its empirical validity or the explanatory power of its hypo-
theses. Thus 3 before the model of group decision-maklng can claim to
represent group behavior it must be demonstrated that it is capable of
surviving the process of disconfirmation by empirical test.
To test a model of the sort described in Chapter iI is not as
straightforward as it might appear. On the one hand there are the data
of the subject groups. And on the other there are the data generated by
the model for each of these groups. It is the comparison of these two
streams of behavior that poses the difficulty. For 3 it is not at all
clear how best to measure such "differences" as exist. Nor are satisfac-
tory measures of "goodness-of-fit" readily available. In shor% a set of
tests are required that will discriminate between both processes and
decisions. And the purpose of the first part of this chapter is to dis-
cuss these difficulties and describe the tests that are to be used on the
group decision medel.
I. The Selection of Alternative Models
The standard procedure to employ when subjecting a model to test
is to compare its emt_Ut with that generated by some alternative or com-
peting model. If the two sets of outputs do not differ significantly 3
then claims of superiority for the proposed model can be rejected. The
chief problem in carrying out such tests lies in selecting an appropriate
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alternative model. Unless the alternative produces outputs which are of a
similar type to those generated by the proposed model 3 comparisons between
same are not particularly meaningful. The task of selecting an alternative
becomes more than usually difficult when one is concerned with information
processing models of human decision behavior. The difficulty does not
depend upon their structure, or the fact that they are stated as computer
programs. Rather it is a function of the range of detail that these models
produce about the decision processes themselves. Since information pro-
cessing models are unique with respect to this level of detail, comparable
alternatives whether drawn from standard or statistical decision theory
are nowhere to be found.
Consider 3 for example, the data provided by the group decision model.
On each trial of the group stage the model produces three decisions 3 one
for each S and one for the group. Concurrently, the Self or Interpersonal
Influence mechanisms may have been activated, and either or both S's
decision nets may have been altered. Hence, to be completely comparable
an alternative model would also have to specify when and under what condi-
tions interpersonal influence takes place, as well as the characteristics
of the stlmulus-situation that evoke each S's responses.
One alternative is to hypothesize that human decision behavior can
_ __p_'_nL,_a oy a random response generator. Such a model is capable of
producing the requisite individual and group decisions. Furthermore, if
each S is represented by an independent random device, the behavior of one
will not be influenced by the behavior of the other. In effect, the model
would exclude from consideration all hypotheses concerning interpersonal
influence other than that represented by random behavior.
To generate comparable outputs the model must be completely specified.
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Oneway of doing so is to represent each S as choosing his trial by trial
responses at random. The group's response would then be chosen by a ran-
domdraw from _S's responses° Oneach trial there are four possible res-
ponses. Thus, this model will: on the average_ pr_ct _a_v_a_ _
group responses correctly one-quarter of the time. If one were concerned
solely with predicting which market will be attended to or whether the
response will be an increase or a decrease3 one would expect half of the
model's outputs to be correct.
Aa_such this is neither a very exciting nor a particularly meaning-
ful alternative. For it makesno assertions about the behavior under
investigation other than the claim of complete ignorance. Despite its
manifold failings it can serve one purpose. That is to provide a lower
limit or bench-mark on the acceptability of the group decision model's
behavior. If the group model is unable to predict responses better than
one-quarter of the time, a critic would be Justified in saying that he
could do as well or perhaps better by tossing a(_coin.
To makesuch an assertion, even if true of a particular model,
does not add muchto our knowledge of decision behavior. If human
declsion-makers can be adequately represented by randomdevices, then there
is little more to be said. Certainly there is no further need to study
their decision behavior. All that is required is to select the appropriate
random generator and test its goodness-of-fito If one holds any other
viewj one is interested in discovering alternative models that contain
explicit statements as to the form and structure of the decision processes
under investigation@ Clearly, the researcher interested in probabilistlc
models can construct alternatives that are in manyrespects more sophic-
tlcated than the random model described aboveo But their properties,
- 81 -
despite the refinements, are quite similar. As a source of fruitful hypo-
theses about human behavior they are to many_ myself included, theoretically
barren.
The solution that is propoae_ to this problem of e!+_ern_-tive test
models proceeds as follows: The group decision model contains a number of
hypotheses about interpersonal and individual learning behavior. These
hypotheses are represented by specific decision processes which operate
in a manner described earlier. One of the objectives in submitting the
model to test is to determine whether these processes contribute signifi-
cantly to the explanation of observed behavior. One way of performing
such tests is to construct alternative models in which at least one of
these hypothesized mechanisms is deleted. In a similar fashion alterna-
tives can be constructed to determine the sensitivity of the Monitor's
.Izarameltervalues by altering the procedures by which they are computed.
For instance, the group decision model assigns the role of Dominance
to the more conservative S_; where conservativeness is measured by the fre-
quency of wins obtained during the last ten trials of Stage io An alterna-
tive model can be constructed by reversing this assignment such that the
less conservative S is now Dominant° The behavior of these two models can
be co_pared and significant differences can be computed. This test can be
carried out for each of the fifteen test groups. And for this sample of
observations it can be determined whether the assignment of Dominance to
the more conservative member leads to significantly better predictions°
Manifestly# it is also possible to use this approach to examine the effects
of using the last fifteen trials of Stage !, instead of the last ten, as the
basis for selecting the Dominant S_o In brief, it is possible to create
alternative models to test the sensitivity of each parameter as well as the
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explanatory value of each decision process.
A. The Test Procedures
Before describing the tests themselves a discussion of the proce-
dures used is in order. The model of group behavior 3 it will be recalled,
is stated in terms of a computer program. This program takes as its input
the data produced by S's during the individual decision phase (Sta6e l) of
the experiment. The program infers decision nets from these data that
represent the bidding behavior of each S. It then sets up the parameter
values of the Monitor. Once these tasks are completed it permits each
decision net to make its response for the first trial and selects one of
them as the group's. The actual group's outcome is used for the simulated
group so that the simulated group will have an indentical stimulus-situation
on each trial. The program then proceeds to the next trial 3 generates its
decision, makes whatever changes are called for in the individual nets, and
so on until the thirty trials have been completed.
In order to determine the effects of a change in parameter setting
or decision process all that has to be done is to alter the program in
the appropriate way. Thus, an alternative is constructed by deleting a
certain process from the program or by changing the procedure by_nich a
parameter value is computed. Once an alternative is created it is run
on the computer against each of the fifteen test groups in the usual
manner. Though there is nothing special about the running of such altered
programs, a few facts abou_the computing time consumed by such procedures
may be of interest.
The group decision model is _ritten in Information Processing
Langua6e E. In its complete form it contains _ slightly more than 5,000
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IFLV statements. The program was run on a Control Data Corp.# G21 computer.
A normal run required the execution of roughly 400, 000 cycles, which on
this computer took approximately 14 minutes. The total computing time con-
was roughly i00 hours o
Each time a simulation of a particular group is run it produces 87
test observations -- one response for each S and one for the group for each
of 29 trials. These observations can be compared with the corresponding
real responses and the errors noted. In this study three types of errors
are used. A response can be in error in its choice of Direction (Increase
or Decrease), in its choice of Side (Left or Right market)3 and either or
both. Accordingly 3 simulated responses are compared to their counterparts
and the nature of the error is noted. For any group the errors are summed
by type to give a set of measures on the performance of the model.
Consider, for example, the data provided-in Table i on the simulated
and real behavior of the group composed of the individuals E.R. and R.F.
Note that Direction_ Side and Total errors are computed for each S as well
as for the group. Furthermore_ these totals can be turned into propor-
tions correct by dividing the number correct by the total number of trials°
For these data the proportions are shown at the bottom of the table° Note
also that the right-most column contains a list of the market situations
prevailing at each trial. Thus, when errors occur one can examine whether
it is a particular part of an S's decision net that is at fault.
An additional type of analysis can be performed by determining the
number of times S's disagreements on bids as well as their group decisions
are correctly predicted. One example of same is given on trial 8 in Table I.
Here E oR. responded with an Increase on the Left while R.F. wanted to Increase
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Example of Simulated and Real Behavior of Group E.R. and R.F.
D -- Direction
S -- Side
SIM. Error SIM. Error SIM. Error Mkt.
Trial E.R. E.Ro D S R.F. R°F. D S Group Group D S Sit____.
i DR DR DR DR DR DR WL
2 DL DL DL DL DL DL LW
3 DL DL DL DL DL DL LW
4 IL DL x IL IR x IL IR x WW
5 IR IR IR IR IR IR WW
6 DL IR x x DL DL DL DL LW
7 IR IR IR IR IR IR WW
8 IL IL IR IR IR IR WW
9 DR DR DR DR DR DR WL
i0 DR DR DR DR DR DR LL
ll IL IL IL IL IL IL WW
12 DR DR DR DR DR DR WL
13 IL DR x x DR DR DR DR WL
14 DL DL DL DL DL DL LW
15 DR DR DR DR DR DR WL
16 IR IL x IL IL IR IL x WW
17 IR DL x x DL DL IR DL x x LW
18 DL DL DL DL DL DL LW
19 IR IR IR IR IR IR WW
20 DR DR DR DR DR DR WL
21 DL DL DL DL DL DL LW
22 IL IR x IR IR IR IR WW
23 IL DR x x DR DR DR DR WL
24 DL DL IL DL x DL DL LW
25 DR DR DR DR DR DR WL
26 IL IL DR IL x x IL IL WW
27 IL IL IR IR IR IL x WW
28 DR DR DR DR DR DR WL
29 IL IL IL IL IL IL WW
Proportions Correct
E oR. R.F. Group
Direction _ •9--3-3 .97
Side .79 .93 .86
Total .76 .90 .86
Table i
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the bid on the Right. They decided to follow R.F. and Increase the Right
market bid. The model correctly simulates both the disagreement and its
outcome. Trial 27 provides an example of a situation where the model
group's bid. Trial 233 on the other hand# illustrates a case where the
model errs in simulating E.R.'s bid but is correct in the remainder of its
choices. Since the model is never put '_ack on track" -- when it errs it
is not corrected -- such analyses provide detailed tests of the model's
empirical validity.
2. Tests on the Model's Parameters
The first items to check, before carrying out an analysis of the
model's decision processes, are the parameter values themselves. Since
parameter values of interest are determined by certain computations per-
formed by the model, tests on their values are in effect tests on the methods
by which they are derived.
a) The model employs in S's Monitor, it will be recalled, an esti-
mate of the long-run frequency of wins that would be generated by his
decision net. A frequency of wins is computed for each market from the
last ten trials of Sta6e 1. These values are S_'s Monitor Frequencies. It is
be used. Accordingly, it is reasonable to inquire: why not use the last
fifteen or twenty trials? Numbers much larger than fifteen can be ruled out
as S's do not generally exhibit stable behavior until around the twentieth
trial. But all numbers less than or equal to fifteen appear equally defen-
sible choices. The only note of caution is the likelihood that a few events
will distort the average value. Hence, to test the model's sensitivity to
changes in the values of the Monitor Frequencies two trial numbers, l0 and 15,
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are used. That is to say, Model 1 will use the last ten trials of Sta$e i
data to compute its Monitor Frequencies, while Model 2 will use the last
fifteen of these trials.
..................... v_w u_ S's du_ing o_age i it is
m
apparent that a number of the early trials are devoted to becoming familiar
with the task. Though later behavior is undoubtedly a consequent of ear-
lier endeavors, S's behavior toward the end of the first 35 trials is more
stable than at the beginning. This observation raises the question: why
should the Mimic Procedure be given the Job of growing a decision net to
reproduce all thirty-five trials? For, if the first few are concerned with
familiarization, then if these trials are ignored, perhaps a more accurate
representation of S's behavior will ensue. One possibility is to ignore
the first ten trials and commence the Mimic Procedure on the eleventh.
Once again there is little reason to suppose that the eleventh trial is a
better starting place than the ninth or the twelfth. The objective is to
test the model's sensitivity to the choice of starting place. Since a number
much greater than ten would not leave sufficient data with which to grow
a complete decision net, it is this number that is used.
To start the Mimic Procedure at the eleventh trial defines a new
alternative, Model 3. Model _t in turn, could be classified into two types:
(i) where Monitor Frequencies are computed from the last ten trials, and
(ii) where the last fifteen trials of Stage 1 are used. The latter alterna-
tive, however, is not considered to be worth s_J_i_gto test. As there are
only twenty-five trials of data available it seems unreasonable to use fif-
teen of them as the basis for estimating the long-run frequency of wins.
Consequently, Model 3 is tested in one form only -- i.e. where its Monitor
Frequencies are derived in a manner identical to Model 1.
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c) The last parameter of note is the assignment of the character-
istics of Dominance. The model's hypotheses lead it to select the S with
the larger Monitor Frequencies as the Dominant member of the group. Not
on may these hypothesea he .................. y ._ov _ _ _,_ _a_
model's behavior is not sensitive to a reversal of the Dominance role. To
answer these questions two tests are required. The first must determine
whether the Dominant member is the one with the higher frequenciesr while
the second is conducted by reversing the Dominance role and examining
the effects of this change on the model's behavior. To perform the latter
test three more alternative models are needed -- Model l' 3 Model 2', and
Model 3' where the "prime" mark refers to the reversal of the Dominance
role.
These three parameters are not the only ones with which the model
of group decision behavior is endowed. There is the measure of a slgnifi-
cant difference between Monitor and Actual Frequencies (one-flfth); there
is the concept of a Trend which hypothesizes a noticing horizon of seven
trials; and there is the concept of a consecutive sequence of wins or losses
which requires three or more of such items to exist before noticing occurs.
The first and the second are a part of the Monitor's procedures for deter-
mining which responses, if any, are to be labelled Violations on a given trial.
They affect the behavior of the Self and Interpersonal influence processes.
The behavior of these processes is to be tested separately. Hence, there
is little to be gained at this point by experimenting with their inner
workings. For, if either or both processes can be dispensed with without
affecting the model's pre61ctive power, then there is little to be gained
by bothering about the origins of their parameter values.
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The concept of what constitutes a series of wins or losses can
indeed be altered. And some of the effects of doing so can be determined
by an analysis of the model. For instance_ change the concept so that it
now requires five or more wins or losses in a _w for this _-ttribute tc bc
appropriate. What this will mean in practice is that these 8ttributes will
seldom be used in the net growing operation. By increasing the horizon to
five, the frequency of such cases will go down, and one will have reduced
the number of attributes available for inclusion in the decision nets.
As a consequence, decision nets will be collapsed more frequently. In the
group p_ase this will increase the effects of Self and Interpersonal influ-
ence upon the respective decision nets, by the collapses these processes
initiate. Changing the number of wins that constitute a run will affect
behavior. But as this parameter value was chosen with some care from ear-
lier investigations, it was decided not to experiment with it further
he re.
The tests on parameter values are based, therefore, on six alter-
native models. Their constituents are displayed in Table 2 for easy
reference. However# before these models are tested against one another_
it is first necessary to determine whether the Dominant member of the group
is the one with the greater Monitor Frequencies.
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Alternative Models for Parameter Tests
Monitor Frequency
i0 Trials 15
Mimic Procedure Dominance Assign'.
I
v" I
v
%/
v"
v
V
vl
35 Trials 25 Correct Reverse
.I IMud_i 1 v
Model 2 V"
Model 3
Model i ' %2"
Model 2 ' V'
Model 3' V
Table 2
A. Test on Monitor Frequencies as a Guide to Dominance
s ) To test for the importance of the Monitor Frequencies it must first
be determined within each group whether one S has higher win frequencies in-
dependent of the number of trials used. The relevant data for the fifteen
groups are presented in Table 3. For each S the frequencies are given in
pairs, one for the left and one for the right market. The Table is constructed
so that S's with higher frequencies are placed on the right. The dotted line
dividing the sample into two sets identifies those groups which are composed
of graduate students (above) from those which are made up of undergraduates
(below the line ).
To compare frequencies within groups one can either sum the frequencies
for both markets or compare the numbers for the respective columns directly.
Using the sum of the two frequencies as the measure it can be seen that in
all cases S's on the right side have Monitor Frequencies greater than or
equal to those of their colleagues on the left. Hence, the use of the last
ten or fifteen trials of Stage 1 does not affect the ranking of group members
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by Monitor Frequency. If the higher frequency identifies the Dominant member 3
the same S will be chosen whether Model 1 or Model 2 is used.
It is interesting to note in Table _ that in all cases the frequencies
_L_ _L_ _u -±_J.U±s column are grea_er than or equal to those of the 15 Trials
columns. This regularity is in a part a product of the series of random
numbers employed by the experimenter to generate market outcomes. However,
when combined with the evidence noted above, these data give some indication
of the stability of S's decision behavior. For there is nothing in the task
itself which prevents S_'s from changing their bidding behavior during these
trials. But these data suggest that there are regularities in each S's
behavior, and that certain relative measures between group members remain
the same over the last ten or fifteen trials of Sta6e i.
b) The next question to examine is whether the S with the higher
Monitor Frequencies is the more Dominant member of the group. The term
Dominance is defined by the Monitor's processes. It reflects the tendency
of that S__to have his response chosen as the group's when disagreements
occur. To test this hypothesis a record was made of all disagreements on
bids by group. These data are presented in Table 4. The groups as well
as their members are listed in the same order as in Table 3_. The column
L.F. (Lower Frequency) contains the number of times the left-hand member
of the group had the disagreement resolved in his favor, while the column
H.F. (Higher Frequency) reflects the number of times disagreements were
resolved in favor of the right-hand member.
An examination of these data reveal that except for groups GB & Ah,
RA & CC, AJ & BC, and LH & TMcC, the S with the higher Monitor Frequencies
had as many or more disagreements resolved in his favor than did his
colleague. If one treats the graduate subjects separately (those groups
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Group
Members
JS& JB
JH&RB
TR& DA
DP&JP
CR & DS
GB & AH
DB & MG
FH & FV
OM& JK
JF&LB
LZ &EJ
RA&CC
AF & BC
LH & TMcC
Monitor Frequencies on Left and Ri6ht Markets
JS
JH
TR
DP
CR
GB
DB
FH
0M
JF
LZ
RA
AJ
LK
_.______._.._______..
Monitor Frequencies Subject
i0 Trials 15
.6
.8, .8
.8, .8
•6, .3
.9, .8
•8, .5
.8, .7
.9, .6
1 °0, .8
.9, .6
.8, .5
•9, .8
.6, .5
1.0, .7
•9, .2
•7, .6
.% .7
°6, .7
.5, .2
.8, .8
.7, .6
•7, .7
•7, .6
.8, .7
.7, .6
•7, .5
•7, .7
.5, .5
•7, .6
•7, .2
JB
RF
RB
DA
JP
DS
AH
MG
FV
JK
LB
EJ
CC
BC
TMcC
Monit or Fre quenc ie
i0 Trials 15
.9, .8
1.0, .7
1.0, -7
•7, -5
1.0, .8
•9, .8
1.0, .8
Io0, .9
1.% .8
1.0, .7
1.0, -5
1.0, .8
•8, .7
.9, .8
•9, .8
•7, .7
•9, .7
.9, .7
•6, .5
.8, .8
.8, .8
•8, .8
•9, .9
.9, .7
.8, .7
.8, .5
•9, .7
•7, .7
•8, .8
.8, .7
Table 3
above the line) there is only one exception (GB & AH) to the rule that the S
with the hi@her frequencies is the more dominant. Within the undergraduate
sample this rule does not hold. In half the groups the dominant member is the
one with the lower Monitor Frequencies. The sample sizes are too small to draw
any major conclusions. But it is interesting to note that one would expect a
"conservative social norm" to be present in groups of graduate students of indus-
trial administration. The data suggest that such is the case. Undergraduate
engineers; however, might be given to a variety of persuasions, and one would
not expect their group behavior to be governed by a conservative norm. Though
the evidence supports this line of reasoning many more subjects would have to
be studied before significant results could be obtained.
- 92 -
Record of Disa6reements on Bids and Their Resolution
Group
JS & JB
ER & RF
JH &RB
TR& DA
DP&JP
CR & DS
GB & AH
DB&MG
FH & FV
m -- -- -- -- -- --
OM& JK
JF&LB
LZ&EJ
RA&CC
AJ&BC
LK & TMcC
Total
Disagreements
8
9
7
6
6
ll
7
8
13
i0
8
i0
12
13
19
Resolution in Favor of
L.F, H.F.
2 6
4 5
3 4
3 3
3 3
4 7
4 3
2 6
6 7
5 5
3 5
1 9
7 5
7 6
io 9
Table 4
The data of Table 4, however, confute the hypothesis that the
S with the greater frequencies is always the Dominant member. If S's
were taken solely from populations of graduate business students, the
hypothesis might be sufficiently close to being correct that one could
ignore the exceptions. In this study such a course of action is not
possible. To initialize the model two procedures can be used. The
first is to accept the hypothesis and assign the Dominance role to the
S with the higher frequencies. This approach permits the model to be
tested under the assumption that evidence contrary to the hypothesis
on conservativeness and dominance should be ignored.
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The second procedure is to initialize the model according to the
data of Table 4. This implies that in four of the fifteen cases Dominance
is assigned to the less conservative member. To use observations from
Sta_e 2 in this manner is admittedly poor practice, as it consumes degrees
of freedom in the test data. However, the objective is to test the sensi-
tivity of the model's parameters and processes. Since the test effects
are more pronounced if Dominance is assigned correctly, (it should be noted
that the results presented in the remainder of this Chapter and that of
Chapter IV are similar in direction though smaller in value if the first
procedure is used. ) it is this method that is employed in all tests. In
so doing it is acknowledged that further investigations must be undertaken
to account for the emergence of the leader-follower relations in two-person
groups.
B. Test on Sensitivity t0 Monitor Frequency: Model i vs. Model 2
To compute significant differences between the behavior of two
alternatives, in this case Model 1 and Model 2# a test is required that
can accommodate the inter-relatedness of these models' outputs. The
parameter tests are to be conducted on a one-change-at-a-tlme basis. But
the effects of a given change may well range throughout the entire model.
Hence, it is not sufficient merely to compare the group decisions of both
models. One must also include the decisions made for each S. In addition
a measure is needed upon which the tests are to be based.
The metric adopted for the analysis of alternative models is the
number of correct responses predicted by the model. For all groups there
is a record of each S's and the group's decisions for all trials. All
models make predictions as to what these decisions will be. Errors are
determined, as in Table 1j according to Direction, Side, and Total 3 for
each S as well as the group. The numberof trials to be predicted per
group is 29. An example of this calculation, per error type, is provided
in Table _ where the number of correct predictions obtained by Model i
are displayed. Once again the Dominant member is the right-hand name of
the pair identifying the group.
A particular model's performance can be measured by adding up the
respective correct predictions and arriving at a total number correct per
column. Given this measure a comparison between two models can be made on
the basis of the differences between these column scores. To determine the
significance of such differences a statistical test is required that is
sensitive to changes in these numbers. One that might have the desired
properties is the one-way analysis of variance test. Under normal circum-
stances the one-way analysis of variance is used to test the null hypothesis
that the items in the various test classes come from populations which have
equal means. Unfortunately, the outputs of the alternative models cannot
be described as coming from populations which have equal means. To do so
would require being able to specify the populations' density functions --
a feat which, in the case of these _s_imulation models, is not easy to per-
ceive how to perform. Concurrently, although there is one metric by which
a model's performance can be judged, it has nine values for each model.
To employ an analysis of variance would imply a distribution function relat-
ing these nine values, when in fact it is the model's decision processes
which determine the relations and as a consequence these values.
A less demanding, and correspondingly weaker, statistic is the
Chi-square for n independent samples. The weakness of the Chi-square
resides in the fact that it is usually impossible to compute its power.
This situation occurs when there is no clear alternative against which it
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Number of Correct Predictions Obtained by Model i
Group
JS & JB
ER &RF
JH& RB
TR & DA
DP & JP
CR & DS
AH & GB
DB & MG
FH& FV
0M & JK
JF& LB
LZ& EJ
CC &RA
BC & AJ
TMcC & OH
Dominant MemberNon-Dominant Member
Dir. _ Side ITotal
2o 16
25 22
24 21
15 14
2o 23
21 16
17 19
17 13
22 14 12
15 18 • 12
28 18 18
20 13 Ii
eo 14 14
22 20 16
21 15 14
307 256 216
Dir. I Side
13 26 22
22 27 m7
e0 29 24
12 23 2O
16 16 26
15 19 24
13 17 17
8 21 14
27 2o
2o 16
2o 19
23 19
15 i_
19 16
13 13
Total 315 291
[Total .... Dir
21 25
26 28
24 29
20 20
14 18
18 21
12 16
13 20
18 24
16 19
ii 23
16 23
i0 22
12 19
9 18
240 325
Group
•IsideI Total
21 21
25 25
24 24
16 16
24 14
21 17
18 12
13 ii
19 15
17 16
16 12
18 15
16 15
18 12
16 13
28_ 238
Teble 5
is being tested. The Chi-square is used when the test data fall into discrete
categories, and when under the null hypothesis the theoretically expected number
of cases for each cell can be deduced.
For example, the Chi-square test is applied by employing the formula:
where _iJ
E..
--IJ
2 r k (0ij - Eij )2
i=l J=l Eij
= observed number of cases categorized in the ith row
of the jth column.
= number of cases expected under H__ooto be categorized
in the i_th row of the _th column.
I |i "'
-%-
It is the determination of the Eij that present a problem. One approach
would be to compute the Eij on the basis of the simple random model discussed
earlier. In this case the Eij would represent the proportion of correct res-
ponses obtained by random draw from an urn where the probability of a correct
response is either 0.5 or 0.25 as appropriate. A comparison between Model 1
and Model 2 would require one to measure the differences generated by their
respective differences between their behavior and that of the random model.
Such a testing procedure is unreasonably involved. It is also far too depen-
dent upon a random device as a guide to good model behavior.
The proposed approach is to state the null hypothesis in terms of the
behavior of one of the Models. An example of same would be: the number of
correct responses obtained by Model 1 is the same (statistically) as those
produced by Model 2. In this event the actual number of correct responses
generated by Model 1 can now be treated as the expected number under Ho.
In short 3 the behavior of Model 1 defines the values of the Eij. Similarly3
the number of correct responses produced by Model 2 become the values of the
Oij. Since the Oij and the Eij are drawn from independent samples, the test
appears to be a valid application of the Chi-square. Moreover, it has a
definite appeal as a method of comparing the behavior of models which produce
a vector of interrelated outputs.
To measure the performance of Model 2 against that of Model 1 the
following test is carried out:
(i) The null hypothesis is stated as: the number of correct responses
obtained by Model 1 is the same as those produced by Model 2.
(ii) The data for the test are provided in Table 6.
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Non-Dominant Member
Dir. I Side Total
oi(_) 291 247 2Ol
Ei(M1) 307 256 216
O i - Ei -16 -9 -15
(oi - __i)2/E_i .84 .32 1.o
Dominant Member
Dir. I Side ITotal
311 385 243
315 291 240
-4 -6 3
•05 .12 .O4
Group
Dir.
Table 6
311 271
325 282
-14 -ll
.60 .43
ISide I Total
223
e38
-15 I.95
(lii) From Table 6, _2 = 4.35 with 8 degrees of freedom. This value is
not significant at the .05 level. The null hypothesis is not rejected.
(iv) Notice, however, that in all but one case Model 1 produces more
correct responses than does Model 2. Though these differences are not statis-
tically significant, one can conclude that a better prediction is not obtained
by using the last fifteen trials of Stage ! to compute the Monitor Frequencies.
In this regard it is also _or_h recalling the data of Table 3. Here it is
evident that Monitor Freqencies based on fifteen trials are always less than
or equal to those based on ten. One is therefore entitled to conclude that
a lowering of Monitor Frequencies does not improve the performance of the
group decision model.
C. Test on Sensitivity to Trials used by Mimic Procedure: Model i vs. Model 3
(i) The null hypothesis is stated as: the number of correct responses
obtained by Model 1 is the same as those produced by Model 3.
(ii) The test data are provided in Table 7.
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 -i(M1)
Oi -
Non-Dominant Member
Dir. Side I Total
313 260 224
307 256 216
6 4 8
.12 .o6 .3o
Dominant Member
Dir. ISlde ITotal
308 293 243
315 291 240
-7 2 3
.16 .Ol .04
Table7
Group
Dir. Side Total
330 284 239
325 282 238
5 2 i
.o8 .Ol o
(iii) From Table 7,_ 2 = 0.78 with 8 degrees of freedom. This value is
not significant and the null hypothesis is not rejected.
(iv) Despite the small_ 2 value Model _ differs from Model 2 in that
its behavlmr is slightly superior to that of Model 1. Except for one instance,
Mode____!l_producesmore correct responses than Model 1. These data suggest that
there is some advantage in ignoring the first ten trials of an S's Stage !
behavior. That the advantage is slight suggests that although S's decision
behavior may stabilize during the latter trials of Stage l_; early response pat-
terns are seldom abandoned completely. However, it would take a larger sample
than that _rovided here plus a more intensive examination of each individual's
behavior to explain in detail the discrepancy between these Models' behavior.
D. Test on Model 3 vs. Model 2
Since Model _'s behavior is slightly superior and Model 2's behavior is
somewhat inferior to Mode____!ll__it is worth examinlngwhether the difference between
Models 3 and _ is statistically significant.
(i) The null hypothesis is: the number of correct responses obtained by
Mode____!lis the same as those produced by Model 2.
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(ii) The test data are provided in Table 8.
o (m)
E_i( 3)
oi -
(oi - E_I)2/ i
i
Non-DominantMember
Dir.
291
313
-22
1.55
I Side
247
260
-13
.65
ITotal
201
_24
-23
2 _36
Dominant Member
311
308
3
.03
Table 8
Dir. Side
285
293
-8
.22
Total
243
243
0
0
Group
Dir.
311
33O
-19
i.I
Side
271
284
-13
.60
ITotal
223
239
-16
1.o7
(iii) From Table 8,_ 2 = 7.58. This value is not significant at the .05
level. Hence, the null hypothesis is not rejected.
(iv) Once again the differences between the two Models are not signifi-
cant. But it should be noted that the difference between Models 3 and 2--is some-
what larger than that between Models 1 and 2_. Thus, while the discrepancies
are not large, the tests on these parameter values have so far revealed Model 3
to be the best performer.
E. Tests on the Sensitivity to a Reversal of the Dominance Role
So far the parameter tests have been conducted with the dominant member
of each group chosen according to the Conservative rule except for the four
iS whether the behavior of Models 1 - 3--are significantly affected by a reversal
of the Dominance role.
(i) The null hypotheses are: the number of correct responses obtained by
Model 1 (Model 2_; Model _) is the same as those produced by Model i' (Mode_____l2-',
Model _' ).
(ii) The test data sre provided in Table 9.
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(lii) From Table 9:
_2for Mo__de__!l1 vs. Model I' = 41.69. This value is signifi-
cant at the .05 level. The null hypothesis can be rejected.
_2 for _a_l o_ ,:s. _a_l O, - _o36_ Tb_is V_Ij__ iS si_nifi-
cant at the .05 level. The null hypothesis can be rejected.
%e for Model 3 vs. Model 3' = 35.8e. This value is signifi-
cant at the .05 level. The null hypothesis can be rejected.
(iv) It is clear that the effect of reversing the Dominance role
is substantial. It can also be seen from Table 9 that very little of
this difference is accounted for by the behavior of the Non-Domlnant member.
In other words, it is the behavior of the Dominant member and the group
as a whole that is markedly affected by reversing Dominance. Since a poor
simulation of the Dominant member's behavior leads to poor group predic-
tions, the effect can be seen to reside in the behavior of this one member.
That all three Models evince a similar effect is further evidence on the
importance in the two-person group of the correct assignment of the Dominance
role.
F. A. Cross-Check on the Above Results
The results of the tests on Models I - 3 are based on a reasonable,
the vector of outputs generated by each Model. However, if one considers
solely the Total column of group responses (the right-most column in Table 5),
then each Model could be represented as producing a sample of size fifteen
of these numbers. Two such Models could then be tested by comparing the
differences between the means of these two samples. Such a test ignores
eight-ninths of the available data. But its compensation lies in its
increased rigor.
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Model 1 vs. Model I'
Non-Dominant
Dir.
oi(m') 287
_i _M_) 307
oi -E_i -20
(Oi - Ei)2/Ei 1.31
Member
Side Total
263 203
256 216
7 -13
•19 .78
i
Dominant Member
Dir.
281
315
-34
3.67
Side ITotal
253 197
291 240
-38 -43
4.96 7.70
Group
Dir. Side
263 259
325 282
-62 -23
i1.5 ]..87
Tota i
19o
238
-48
9.71
Model 2 vs. Model 2'
oi(m')
__i(m)
oi -E_i
(°i- _-i)2/E-i
Non-Dominant Member
Dir.
283
291
-8
.22
Side Total
253 193
247 2Ol
6 -6
•15 .18
Dominant Member
Dir. ISide ITotal
!
27o
311
-41
5.42
246 187
285 243
-39 -56
5.34 12.9
Group
Dir. Side
272 255
311 271
-39 -16
4.9 .94
ITotal
192
223
-31
4.31
Model 3 vs. Model 3'
oi(M3,)
__i(_)
oi - E_i
(_%-
Non-Dominant Member
Dir. Side Total
293 260 2o3
313 260 224
-20 0 -21
1.e8 o 1.97
Dominant Member
Dir. I Side iTotal
284 251 199
3o8 293 243
-24 -42 -44
1.87 6.02 7.96
Group
Dir. Side
287 253
330 284
-43 -31
5.6 3.38
ITotal
].96
239
-43
7.74
Table 91
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The statistic that is employed to perform this task is the
Randomization Test for Two Independent Samples. 1-/ The statistic is the
Student t and is defined by the formula:
t=
E(B - - 1 ! )na+ %- 2 +%
where, A and B = the respective sample means
na and nb = the respective sample sizes
To test, for example, the Total correct group responses of Model 1 and
Model 2 one merely needs to compute the mean number correct for each Model,
and the sum of the squares of the differences between each score and the
mean. Since -an = 2b = 15 the value of _t for 28 degrees of freedom can be
directly computed and examined for significance. The relevant values of
this test are provided in Table i0 alongside those already obtained for
the Chi-square.
The results in Table i0 compare moderatelywell with one another.
However, for _ vs. M(3') the ! value is greater than that obtained for
M(1) vs. M(l'), while the respective values of _ are in the reverse order.
Also the difference between M(2) and M(2') is significant as measured by
"_t...... t.hOll_'h_ non-significant as measured by_ Student t. These discrepancies
are a result of the _ statistic being based only on one-ninth of the total
data. Presumably, one could compute the t value for each of the nine columns.
But it is not entirely clear what woUld be gained by such an undertaking.
l/ See, S. Siegel, Nonparametric Statistics, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1956,
PP. 152-58 # for a detailed discussion of this test.
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A Comparison of_ 2 and Student t Tests
Null
Hypothesis
,, .
"(1):M(3)
M(3)--M(2)
M(!):M(l')
M(2):M(2')
M(3):M(3')
9t 2
Statistic
4.35
o.78
7.58
41.69
34.36
35.82
,, J
Signif. at
•05 level
Student t
I
Statistic
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Signif. at
•05 level
0.56
0.0
0.64
1.86
1.22
2.06
i
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
.. , L, ,, ,
At .05 level 9< 2 = 15.51, Student t = 1.70
Table i0
One would be faced with nine pairs of t values, some significant and some
not. The problem would then be to decide upon their significance. As a
result, it was decided to avoid this dilemma and accept the hazard of basing
the cross-check on a single application of the Student t statistic.
3. Testin5 the Model A_ainst a Simple Random Alternative
Before proceeding to compare the performance of the group decision
model to that of other alternatives, a decision has to be made as to which
Model to use. Models 1 and _ are the obvious contenders. And as Model _ is
slightly superior it is this one that will be employed to represent the group
decision theory in all further tests.
The simple random model, Model _ is based on the assumption that on
each trial the four possible responses are equally likely events. Hence,
one would expect Model R to generate the correct group response one-quarter
of the time. Similarly, one would expect it to choose the correct Direction
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and Side one,half of the time. To determine the significance of any differ-
ences between the behavior of Model 3 and Model R a statistic is required.
The one selected as appropriate is the normal approximation to the binomial
distribution, since the Models' outputs can be represented in terms of pro-
portions correct instead of the actual numbers themselves. Accordingly, for
Total group responses the normal density function (Model R) is defined by
the moments/_ = p = .25 and G" =_. For the Direction and Side responses
density function has the moments/_ = _ = .50 and 6 =s _"the
(i) The null hypothesis is stated as: the proportion of correct
responses obtained by Mode_____l3 comes from the same population density func-
tions which represent Model R under the two conditions.
(ii) The test results are presented in Table ll.
(ill) From Table ll it is evident that in fourteen out of fifteen cases
the Total proportion of correct predictions made by Model S differ signifi-
cantly from those one would expect under Model B. For these data one can
reject the null hypothesis.
(a) Model _ however, only predicts a proportion of the Side decisions
that are significantly different from Model R's in six out of fifteen cases
or 40_ of the time. This number is considerably lower than the 93_ achieved
on Total correct. But it is difficult to determine the significance of
these numb___, mhn_=_ _o _,,_ _^_ ^_^_ _---'_ ...... mpi
of binary responses, one would have to produce a theoretically expected number
of same before one could apply e binomial test.
One approach would be to argue that since a rejection region of .05
was used in the original test, the expected value to use in the binomial
test is P = .05. Using this value for P and x = 6, N = 15.
b- lO5 -
(.o5)6 (.95)9
=6' 9.'
p(x) = 4.92 x lO"5
Thus, the probability of obtaining six out of fifteen significant differences,
if the expected frequency is 0.05, is a very small number. For this test
the data for the Side column also reject the null hypothesis.
On the other hand, it could well be argued that a P = .05 is too
small, and on the grounds of "reasonableness" a P = .25 would provide a more
exacting test. Using this value for P
= 15' (.25) 6 (.75)'
p(x) = 9.0 x io"2
I
Here the probability of obtaining six out of fifteen is nine in a hundred.
Under this test one would not reject the null hypothesis. But the choice
of s value for P is quite arbitrary. What these tests provide is the
knowledge that if the true value of P_ is less than 0.25, then the data for
the Side column can be used to reject the null hypothesis.
(b) From the above discussion it is clear that the data for the
Direction column lead one to reject the null hypothesis. For here there are
twelve out of fifteen cases where the proportion of correct predictions made
by Model 3 differ significantly from those one would expect under Model R.
Accordingly t using a value of P = 0.25 one obtains
l_.' (.25)12 ( .75)3p(x) = 12, 3'
p(x) = 8.1xlO "4
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Results on Test of Model _ vs. Model R
Group
JS &JB
ER&RF
JH&RB
TR&DA
DP&JP
CR & DS
AH & GB
DB &M_
FH&FV
OM&JK
JF&LB
LZ &EJ
CC&RA
BC & AJ
TMcC & LK
Proportion
of Dir.
Chosen
Correctly
.90
.97
1.00
.69
.72
.69
Signif.
st the
•05 level
(1)
Proportion
of Side
Chosen
Correctly
.59
.72
.83
.62
.76
.76
.72
.66
.76
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
.69
.86
.83
.59
.83
.79
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
.69
.45
.62
.62
.55
.55
•52
.62
.59
Signif.
at the
•05 Lev.
(1)
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Total
Proport.
Chosen
Correctly
.66
.86
.83
.55
.59
.59
.48
.38
.48
.52
.41
.45
.48
.41
-55
Signif.
at the
•05 Lev.
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
(I) At the .05 level Model _ differs from Model R if the proportions correct for
the former are _-0.68.
(2) At the .05 level Model _ differs from Model R if the proportions correct for
the former are_0.41.
Table ii
II II
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(iv) Though the results listed in Table ii are sufficient to
reject Model R as a viable alternative, it is evident that Model
is weakest in correctly predicting a group's Side response. This failing
decision. But, if one looks at the data for Model 3 in either Table 7 or
8 it is clear that the number of correct predictions for Side are always
less than those under Direction for both members of the group. As/a
result, it appears to be a failure to predict the individual responses
that leads to the inferior performance on the group's Side decisions.
Chaste r IV
Testin 6 the Group Decision Model: Part II
i. Tests on the Model's Decision Processes
The t_sk of subjecting the major processes of the group decision
_odel to test is qu_te strslghtforward. It is carried out by constructing
alternative models in vhlch one or more of these processes are deleted.
The behavior generated by these alternates is then oompared in turn to
that produced by the standard model -- Model 3- The objectlvelsto dis-
cover whether any or all of the hypothesized processes can be deleted from
the group model without impairing its predictive abilities.
(s) The first process to be tested in this manner is the procedure
by which a group decision is made when disagreement occurs. From the
discussion of these decision rules in Chapter II it will be recalled that
one of their effects is to make the group's choice that of the Dominant
member unless specific conditions prevail. To test for the absence of
this process one cannot just dispense with it. For the model needs some
decision rule with which to resolve conflicts. Furthermore 3 the effect
of reversing the Dominance role has already been examined (see Chapter
III_ sec.2.E.) so that this is not what is required here. Manifestly 3 one
could construct alternative methods for handling disagreements. But these
would most likely interfere with the behavior of the Interpersonal Influence
process which is interrelated with the Dominance rules for resolving con-
flicts.
The alternative that seems appropriate is to permit disagreements
to be settled on an equally likely basis. That is to say 3 the decision rule
is that of a binary random generator -- a tossed coin will do -- where the
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probability of each member's decision being selected is one-half. The model
incorporating this random resolution rule, Model _ is in all other respects
identical to Mode____!l3--. A comparison of their behavior is a test on the
Dominance rules employed by the group decision model in so far as the alter-
native outputs are produced by a neutral or non-blased decision rule.
(b) The next process of interest is the Self-Influence process.
This is the set of rules which allows each individual's Monitor to alter
the decision behavior of its decision nets. Such alterations are initial-
ized when a decision net's response on a particular trial appears on its
own Violation List. The alternative that is used, Model _ is constructed
by deleting the Self-Influence procedure from the Monitor. Thus, a compar-
ison between the behaviors of Model SI and Model 3 is a test on the con-
tribution this process makes to the explanation of the groups' behavior.
(c) Model ST is devoid of a Self-Influence process. As such it
represents a group model that operates solely with an Interpersonal
Influence procedure. In order to test for the importance of this latter
process one would construct a model in which this process was inactive.
However, it must be remembered that the Interpersonal Influence process
is only evoked after a number of disagreements have occurred and certain
other conditions have been satisfied. As a result, in the simulation of
any one group's behavior it may not be employed with any frequency. Clearly,
the greater the level of conflict in a group the greater the likelihood of
the process being activated. Consequently, there is little point in testing
this process by itself unless one had a large enough sample of suitable
groups. The test that appears instead to be more appropriate is to con-
struct an alternative_ Model AI, in which all influence processes are inop-
erative. These processes represent the model's adaptive (learning) capabilities,
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And a comparison of Model AI and Model 3 will determine the contribution
the influence procedures make to the model's explanatory power.
(d) The most parsimonious alternative that can be constructed from
cesses under its control, and where disagreements are resolved On an equally
likely basis. Such a model would be made up out of a combination of Models
DR and A_II. It would behave as though each individual was unaffected by his
own as well as his colleague's decisions. Moreover, it would regard the
group's decision as in no way affecting the decisions of its members. In
short, each individual would behave throughout the group trials as though
he were still performing the experimental task by himself. The parsimonious
model is labelled Model P. A comparison between it and Model _ is a collec-
tive test on all the processes employed by the Monitor in the complete
group decision model.
The tests on the model's decision processes are based, therefore,
on four alternatives whose characteristics are displayed for easy reference
in Table i. Before these tests are conducted one must first make sure that
the initial conditions for such tests are satisfied. For unless each group
satisfies the model's initial conditions any tests on their subsequent
behavior (the process tests) will be empirically vacuous.
The initial conditions which need to be satisfied can be stated
as follows: During Stage 2_ the inferred discrimination nets for each S
must be capable of reproducing his decision behavior to some "satisfactory
level." For if the model cannot account for the behavior of each S prior
to the deletion of certain processes, how is one to adjudge the effect
of such deletions? The only difficulty inherent in the speciflcstion of
the initial conditions is the notion of what constitutes a "satisfactory
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Alternative Models for Process Tests
Replace Dominance
Rule with Random
Choice Rule
J
Model DR V
Model SI
Model AI
Model P
Delete Self-
Influence
Frocess
Delete Interpersonal
Influence
Process
i
Table i
level. ''The procedure adopted here is to compute the total Direction and
side errors made by Mode____!l3 for each troup -- this is a summation of the
errors made for each S. The normal approximation to the binomial distri-
butlon wlth_= p = .50 and _ = where n= 4 x 29 = 116, is then
employed to provide a measure of the total errors permissible for a given
group. Since there is an interaction between the decisions of the Dominant
and Non-Dominant member a level of significance of O.O1 is used. From these
specifications the number of allowable errors per group is 44.2. Thus, the
decision rule becomes that of rejecting all groups, as not satisfying the
initial conditions, if the sum of the Direction and Side errors for both
members is greater than 44.2. The data for this test are provided in Table 2.
The results indicate that five groups do not meet the requisite stan-
dards. Manifestly, there are a number of ways in which these error rates can
be explained. First, it could be argued that the model is not sufficiently
sensitive to accommodate a diversity of behavior - these groups have merely
exhibited behavior with which the model is unable to cope. There is some
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Goodness-of-Fit of Initial Conditions
Group
JS & JB
ER&RF
JH&RB
TR&DA
E_&JP
CR&DS
AH & GB
DB&MG
FH&FV
OM&JK
JF&LB
LZ&EF
CC&RA
BC & AJ
TMcC & LK
Dir. +Side
Errors,
Non-Dom.
,
Dir. + Side
Error|,
Dominant
24 i0
ii 4
l0
27
Total Unsat isfactory
Dir. + Side Groups
Errors
34
15
,
15
13
1417 31
22 23 45 v /
28 22 5o %/
21 12 33
28 22 50
19
19
29
22
29
12
16
18
21
31
4S
45
4o
5o
V
Table 2
evidence to support this claim, particularly if one looks at Tables _ and 4_
of Chapter Ill. From these data it is apparent that three of the five recal-
citrant groups (AH & GB, CC & RA, and TMcC & LH) are ones in which the less
conservative member takes the Dominant role. However, when the Dominant role
is reversed, as in the parameter test, Sec. 2,E., the error rate for these
- if3 -
groups increases. Hence# the poor performance is not Just a question of
the assignment of the Dominant role.
A trial by trial inspection of the behavior during Stages 1 and 2_
of these groups reveals that at least one member of each is highly unstable
in his decision behavior. In Stage 1 instability is evinced by the number
of times the Mimic Procedure has to add new nodes and responses during the
last ten trials. During Stage 2_ one expects the inferred decision nets to
predict each S's decisions correctly for the first few trials. For the
model is based upon the assumption that S's will continue to behave in
Stage _2 as they did during the latter part of Stage 1. When S's change
their bidding procedures at the beginning of Stage 2__ this is taken as evi-
dence of an instability in their decision behavior.
Additional evidence of the effects of instability is obtained by
correlating measures on the behavior of S's from Stages 1 and 2. For Stage 1
one counts 3 as above, the number of times the Mimic Procedure added new
nodes and responses during the last ten trials° (The Mimic Procedure adds
new nodes when it is unable to predict correctly. ) For Stage 2_one uses
the total trials correctly predicted° One would expect that the greater the
number of new nodes added during the last ten trials the poorer the prediction
of Individual _ 2 responses. Correlating these two sets of values for
all thirty S's gives an r = 0.63.
A more rigorous test would be to ask a sample of S's to take part in
Stage 3_ immediately after completing Stage lo This way one would duplicate
the experimental conditions and would, at the same time, be able to determine
how well the decision nets inferred from Stage 1 are able to explain subse-
quest individual behavior. In future investigations these data will be
colle cted.
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To accuse certain S's of being unstable in their bidding behavior
does not excuse the model from being unable to accommodatesuch behavior.
It merely highlights the model's inability to cope with S's who alter their
behavior from Stage _l to Stage 2. It is hoped that further study will iden-
tify some of the processes that the model needs if it is to be able to
account for such changes. But, for the time being, these S's do not satisfy
the model's initial conditions.
The tests on the model's processes, then, are divided into two parts.
The first employes the entire sample of groups. The second excludes from
the test data the five refractory groups. This procedure is employed in
order to provide as strong a test as possible on the processes under consid-
eration. For differences that are detected in the total sample ought to appear
with greater significance in the reduced sample.
A. Tests on the Importance of the Dominance Rule: Model _ vs. Model DR
The effect of replacing the Dominance rule with a random choice
mechanism can be observed by comparlng_ by the Chi-square test, the behaviors
of Model 3_ and Model DR for the Total and Reduced samples.
(i) The null hypothesis is given by: the number of correct responses
obtained by Model 3 is the same as those produced by Model DR.
(ii) The test data for both samples are provided in Table 3. It should
be noted that differences will appear between these models only in the group
decisions. Thus, data are provided for group columns alone.
(lii) For the Total sample, _2 = 16.95 with 2 degrees of freedon
(For G = .05, _2 = 5-99 with 2 d.f.) This value is significant at the .05
level. Hence_ the null hypothesis can be rejected.
For the Reduced sample, _2 = 8.43 which is significant at the .05
level. Thereforej the null hypothesis can also be rejected for the Reduced
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Data of Model 3 vs. Model.DR for T.ota!.Sample
oi -
Group
Dir. _ Side I Total
Ot_),
_- .7-r
330
-36
3.92
i.-r_
284
-36
4.56
239
-45
8.47
Data of Medel 3 vs. Model DR for Reduced Sample
£i (teR)
__i(_.)
°i - _-I
(£i - _-i)2/&l
Group
TotalDiro I Side
2ll 179
231 201
-20 -22
1.73 2.4
142
169
-27
4.3
Table _
sample data.
(iv) The results of the two tests indicate that the Dominance rule
is an important part of the group decision model. As the Chi-square value
for the Total sample is much greater than for the Reduced sample, the
Dominance rule contributes significantly to the correct choice of group
decisions in the five unstable groups as well. As a result, whether it is
the less or more conservative member who takes the Dominance role, it is
clear that a model of two-person group behavior must include a process which
accommodates the effects of this role on group choices.
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B. Tests on the Self-Influence Process: Model 3 vs. Model SI
The importance of the Self-Influence process is determined by com-
paring the behaviors of Models _ and S__Ifor the Total and Reduced samples.
(1) The null hypothesis is: the number of correct responses obtained
by Mode____!l_ is the same as those produced by Model SI.
(ii) The test data are arrayed in Table 4.
(lii) For the Total sample,_ 2 = 11.81 with 8 degrees of freedom.
This value is not significant at the .05 level. The null hypothesis is not
rejected.
For the Reduced sample,_ 2 = 15.58 which is significant at the .05
level. The null hypothesis can be rejected for the Reduced sample.
(iv) The results of these tests are quite interesting. The Chl-square
values indicate that the presence or absence of the Self-Influence process
does not affect the model's predictions of the five recalcitran_ groups.
This is attested to by a_ 2 = 3.28 for these groups. Though the five groups
suggest that one should dispense with the Self-Influence process, the remain-
ing test groups provide strong contrary evidence. Accordingly, it appears
that the Self-Influence Process does represent part of the observed behavior.
Furthermore, if attention is restricted to the stable decislon-makers,
group's declslons.
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Data of Model 3 vs o Model SI for Total Sample
Non-Dominant Member
Diro
293
313
-20
l:28
Side Total
240 203
_6o 224
-20 -21
1.54 1.97
Dominant Member
Dir o
319
3o8
ll
o.39
I Side Total
266 225
293 243
-27 -18
2.49 1.33
Group
Dir °
315
33o
-15
.68
I Side
261
284
-23
1.86
Tots]
231
239
-8
.27
Data of Model 3 VSo Model Sl for Reduced Sample
Non-Dominant Member
Dir o
2OO
22O
-20
1.82
Side IT°tal
167 144
177 159
-lO -15
°57 1.42
Dominant Member
Dir.
221
219
2
°02
Side I Total
186 157
217 179
-3l -22
4.43 2°7
Group
Dir. Side ITotal
213 178 159
231 201 169
-18 -23 -lO
1.4 2.63 .59
Table 4
C. Tests on All Influence Processes: Model 3 vs. Model AI
Having determined what happens to the model's behavior when the Self-
Influence process is taken out_ the next step is to test for the absence of
both the Self- and Tn'l-._=v"n_='_mn_'l Tn+_111_m_ n_-m.ma_:: _m. +_: ma+_l o_ D_A ....
samples.
(i) The null hypothesis is given by; the number of correct responses
obtained by Model _ is the same as those produced by Model AIo
(ii) The test data are provided in Table 5o
(iii) For the total sample_ = 18o86 which is significant at the °05
level. For the total sample one can reject the null _othesiso
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leve i.
For the Reduced sample, _2 = 21o0 which is significant at the °05
The Reduced sample also permits one to reject the null hypothesis°
I_%s of Model q vs_ Model AI for Total Sample
gl "
2
(°i- )l -i
Non-Dominant Member
Dirol Side I Total
280
313
-33
3.48
234 195
26O 224
-26 -29
2°60 3.78
Dominant Member
Diro I Side
305 272
308 293
-3 -21
°03 loS1
ITotal
221
243
-22
1-99
Group
Dir. I
3o7
33o
-23
1°60
Side ITotal
259 219
284 239
-25 -20
2°20 i@67
Data of Model _ vs. Model AI for Reduced Sample
Non-Domlnant Member
Dir.
220
-26
3°08
Side I Total
159 134
177 159
-18 -25
1.83 3°92
Dominant Member
Diro I Side ITotal
212
219
-7
.22
196 1_5
217 179
-21 -24
2°04 3,,22
Group
Diro
210
231
-21
io91
Side I Total
178 15o
2Ol 169
-23 -19
2.64 2o14
Table
(iv) There are three points of note about thesed data° The first is
that once again the Reduced sample provides a greater difference between the
models' behavior° This implies that the difference for the other groups is
negligible. Indeed_ _2 = 1.88o Secondly, the value of the Chi-square for the
Reduced sample asserts that the deletion of the influence processes from the
model has a pronounced effect for these groups. That the Chi-square value is
significant for the Total sample is a further indication of the importance of
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these processes.
The third point relates to the Interpersonal Influence process
itself. If one compares the Chi-square values obtained from the Reduced
sample data of Tables 4 and 5, the difference is due to the Interpersonal
Influence process o This difference, though modest# is in the right direc-
tion. It becomes quite significant, however, if one considers only those
groups in which there is a substantial amount of disagreement. In other
words# if both members always agree on what to do# the Interpersonal
Influence process will not be evoked and its effect on behavior will be
nil. To study its effects one requires frequent disagreement. Unfortunately#
a number of the groups which generated the greatest disagreement are num-
bered among those who do not satisfy the model's initial conditions. But
an inspection of the remaining, high disagreement groups (see Table _,
Chapter III; and Table 2 above) suggests that an Interpersonal Influence
process is required if the model is to account for the observed behavior.
D. Tests on the Parsimonious Model: Model 3 VSo Model P
The final test on the model's processes is an attempt to discover
whether as good or better predictions are obtained if all Monitor processes
including the Dominance rule are dispensed with.
(1) The null hypothesis is given by: the number of correct responses
obtained by Model 3 is the same as those produced by Model Po
(ii) The test data are provided in Table 6.
(ill) For the Total sample_ 2 = 41o73 which is significant at the
•05 level. These data reject the null hypothesis.
For the Reduced sample, _(2 = 39.03 which also is significant at the
•05 level. The Reduced sample rejects the null hypothesis°
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Data of Model 3 VSo Model P for Total Sample
Non-Dominant Member
Diro
28O
313
-3B
3.48
ISide ITotal
234 195
260 224
-26 -29
2 °60 2°78
Dominant Member
Dir.
305
308
-3
.-03
Side ITotal
272 221
293 243
-21 -22
1.51 1.99
Group
Diro I Side
288 e31
330 284
-42 -53
5.35 9.9
Data of Model _ vs. Model P. for Reduced Sample
I Total
183
239
-56
13.l
gi( )
°i -
(oi -
Non-Dominant Member
Dir.
22O
-5
Side ITotal
159 134
z77 159
-18 -25
1.83 3.92
Dominant Member
Diro Side ITotal
212 196 155
el9 el7 179
-7 -21 -24
°22 2:o4 3.22
Group
Dir o
231
-35
5.3
I Side Total
161 125
2Ol 169
-4o -44
7.95 llo4"
Table 6
(iv) The result of these tests is that Mode____lPis a very poor predictor
of group behavior. Accordingly_ it is clear that the Monitor's decision pro=
cesses are important contributors to the explanation of the test data. Though
each process can, no doubt_ be refined and imp roved_ a model that ignores them
completely is unable to account in a satisfactory manner for the observed
declslon-making behavior.
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E. A Cross-Check on the Above Results
As in the case of the tests on the model's parameter values it is
worth checking the results obtained by the Chi-square with those generated by
an application of the Student t statistic@ The results for both the Total and
Reduced samples, including the statistical significance of same, are presented
in Table 7.
In all but one case the values of the Student _ correspond in significance
to those of the Chi-square. The exception occurs with the data on the test of
the Self-Influence process. The Chl-square value for the Reduced sample is Just
greater than, while that of the Student _ is somewhat less than the value required
Null Hypothesis
Total S. I Reduced
M_(3_):_M(DR)
M(3)--M_(S__I)
_MC3_)_(A_)
M(3_)=_M(P_)
M(3)-_DR)
M(3)=M(S_)
_M(_):_M(P_)
Summar[, of Test Results
2
Statistic
11@81
15o58-
2.06*
0.34
1.78"
2.55*41.73"
-39.03*
Student t
Statistic
1.%* (2)
o.71 (2)
1.92-(2)
* -- Denotes values significant at .05 level
(I) For 2 d°f. at .05 level _2 = 5.99
(2) For 18 d.f. at .05 level Student t = 1.73
For remaining values, significance level of _2 = 15o513 and that of
Student t = 1.70.
Table 7
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for significance at the °05 level° As noted earlier, the Student t uses
one-ninth of the data employed by the Chi-squareo Thus, this discrepancy
is not hard to comprehend°
that a simpler model -- one in which one or more of the Monitor processes
are deleted -- will perform as well as or better than the model of group
decision behavior as represented by .Model 3.
2. Further Examination of the Results
Additional evidence of the model's capacities and shortcomings can
be obtained by examining individual and group decisions in more detail°
One such approach is to inspect the model's errors in group decisions
in terms of the market situation prevailing on those trials° The ques-
tions of interest are: can these group errors be attributed to an
inability to reproduce group decisions on particular market situations --
Win-Nin for example? Or is it the case that these errors are distributed
more or less evealyover all decision situations?
To discover the answers to these queries data are presented in
Table 8 on the errors made (group decisions only) under each of the four
market situations° As can be seen, there are two entries for each market
state. The first represents the proportion of group predictions that
are correct; the second records the number of occurrences of this market
situation for the group°
From the mean values provided at the foot of each column of Total
Occurrences it is clear that market situations do not occur on an equally
likely basis° (It is necessary to talk in terms of the means as sample
sizes are in many cases too small to compute significant differences)°
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Record of Group Predictions by Market Situation
,Group
JS &JB
ER& RF
JH&RB
TR&DA
nP&JP
CR&DB
AH & GB
DB & MG
FH&FV
OM&JK
JF&LB
LZ&EJ
CC &RA
BC & AJ
TMcC & LB
,,,,, ,
Means I
!
Win-Win
?rOpo Total
_orr. NOo
Win-Loss Loss-Win
P_po Total Fropo Totai
.... _ 9 A1_o
°75 8
loOO 9
1.00 9
°56 9
1.00 2
°67 6
loOO 3
°25 4
1.oo 3
•63 8
°25 8
°20 5
°67 9
°80 5
°67 9
II ,,
.75 8
°88 8
i.oo 7
.5o lo
loO0 6
ioO0 8
o71 7
loO0 8
°88 8
.56 9
°60 lO
°67 6
o_,5 ll
o13 8
°5o 8
°72
I,
.7o lO
•73 11
.67 12
.67 9
.45 2o
.4o 15
.32: 19
.12 17
.2B 17
.5o 12
.4o lO
.47 17
.38 8
°4o 15
.5o 6
°53 13.2
Table 8
,, ,,
8ol
Loss-Loss
Prop. Total
,,,.,u,t. _" ° Nu o
.0o 3
lo00 1
.00 1
o00 i
°00 !
.00 i_
.00 i
o00 I
o00 i
o00 i
°50 6
olh !o6
each S's decision processes° The effects of S's decision instabilities
are discussed above and need not be repeated° However# these errors are
also partly a result of the model's failure to predict the resolution of
all disagreements correctly° For, if the model predicts each member's
response and yet fails to select the right group response_ this will show
up as an error in the group decision° Similarly, group errors can occur#
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There is, as one would expect, a bias in favor of Win-Win and against
Loss-Loss situations. The actual number of occurrences of same depends
for each group on the processes they use° Conservative (low price)
groups enjoy a preponderance of Win-Win outcomes, while less conservative
groups obtain a greater proportion of Win-Loss and Loss-Win's.
That this record of market outcomes is dependent on conservative-
ness as defined by the model is evinced by comparing the Monitor
Frequencies (Table 3, Chapter IV) for each group and the data in Table 8.
Groups E_ & JP, AH & GB, FH & FV, and LZ & EJ have Monitor Frequencies
equal to or greater than those of the remainder° These groups generate
seventeen or more instances of Win-Wino Groups with more rlsk-taking
members, e.g. TR & DA, CC & RA, and TMcC & LH_ have Monitor Frequencies
equal to or less than the others and obtained nine or fewer instances of
Win-Win. This comparison can:be made more explicit by adding up the
Monitor Frequencies of each group. The maximum possible value for a group
is 4.0. The five conservative groups above have the values 3.5, 3°3, 3°4,
3.6, and 3.5 respectively° The three risky groups have the values e.3,
2.6, and 2.8. It is evident, therefore_ that conservativeness as defined
by Monitor Frequencies implies a greater frequency of winning outcomes.
The mean values of the Proportion Correct columns indicate that
...... _ _u_uu_ r_sponses to Win-Loss and Loss-Wln situations better
than either of the two remaining ones° These outcomes oomprise approxi-
mately half of the total (219 occurrences out of 435), while Win-Win make up
virtually all of the rest° Though the model predicts the responses of some
groups for Wi___nn-Los___sand or Lo__.ss-Winsituations with great success its record
is less impressive on Win-Wln's, and very poor on Loss-Loss 's. These errors
are in part a consequence of the Mimic Procedure's failure to specify correctly
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aside from erroneous predictions of responses, because the model predicted
agreement when there was none or disagreement when it did not take place.
To inspect the model's capacity to generate agreement and disagree-
ment a record was made of same for all trials. These data are recorded
in Table 9. They are presented in much the same manner as used in Table 8.
Under each market state there are two categories, Agree and Disagree. The
pair of numbers records the proportion of same the model predicts and the
total number of cases respectively. It should be noted that these data
refer to the agreements and disagreements generated by the model without
reference to whether the actual responses themselves are correct.
(Data which include the latter condition are presented in Table lO)o
A comparison of the Agree and Disagree columns in Table 9 indicates
that in most cases the model is better at predicting the former° (Once
again the smallness of the sample sizes precludes checking for statistical
significance.) It is also apparent that in some groups there is a substan-
tial amount of disagreement which the model is unable to account for. But
even when these inadequacies are taken into consideration there is the
added difficulty of correctly predicting the resolution of these disagree-
ments. In short, the model can account adequately for individual responses
and still have a poor record on group decisions.
,L.Table lO the data of Table 9 are recorded to reflect the in-
stances where the model predicts the complete set of individual responses.
Comparing the entries of Tables 9 and lO identifies the extent to which the
Model predicts agreements and disagreements with incorrect responses. For
example, group JS & JB are shown to have agreed on what to do in WW situa-
tions in nine out of the ten times° The model predicts that they will agree
six out of nine times (Table 9)_ but predicts exactly what they did only
JS & JB
ER&RF
JH&RB
TR&DA
I_F & JP
CR & DS
AH & GB
DB & MG
FH&FV
OM&JK
JF&LB
IZ&EF
CC&RA
BC & AJ
McC & LK
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Record of Predicted A_reements and Disagreements
Win-Win
Agree Disagr o
•7; 9 .o; l
.8; 6 °4; 5
•7; 7 oO; 5
°8; 6 o7; 3
•9;13 .3; 7
i.o; 5 .2;io
.9;13 °5; 6
.9;12 .2; 5
.9; 7 oi;1o
.6; 5 oi; 7
.8; 6 oO; 4
i.o; 9 ol; 8
.8; 4 °3; 4
°9; 7 °4; 8
loO; 2 °8; 4
Win-Loss Loss-Win
Dis'agr.'Agree Disagr o
.6; 5 o0; 3
io0; 7 o0; 2
Io0; 8 .0; i
°6; 7 oO; 2
Io0; 2
_6; 5 oO; i
°3; 3
°3; 3 loO; i
°7; 3
°7; 7 1.0; i
•7; 7 oO; 1
°6; 5
°6; 7 o0; 2
°7; 3 .5;
o0; 1 oi; 8
Agree
°8; 5
.8; 6
°9; 7
°8; 8
1.0; 6
°9; 8
°9; 7
°8; 6
.8; 6
.7; 7
.6; 7
.8; 4
.7; 6
°8; 6
loO; 3
o0; 3
.0; 2
.5; 2
o0; 2
.0; 2
•5; 2
.o; 3
.0; 2
io0_ 2
°4; 5
Loss -Loss
Agree DisIsgr o
°5; 2 oO; i
io0; i
.0; i
.0; i
.0; 1
io0; I
io0; i
io0; 1
io0; 1
i o0_ i
.5; 4 °5; 2
Tia>le
..... _ _ ._A_ _u=_ _u-_ _u)o ._u.L- _LAA_ g_u,,p bali ol Lnese errors are due
to faulty responses for both S's which just happen to agree with one another°
Group ER & RF present z on the other hand, a case where all entries in both Tables
are the same. Since the model is never corrected ®- put back "on track" -- the
result is a tendency to reinforce its own mistakes in cases like JS & JBo This
tendency is further strengthened by the effects of the influence processes° If
the model does not predict the Dominant member's responses correctly, and if
Group
JS & IB
ER & RF
JH&RB
TR & DA
_&JP
CR & DS
AH & GB
DB & MG
FH & FV
0M&JK
JF&LB
I_&EJ
CC&RA
BC & AJ
McC & LH
Win-Win
'Agree Disagr o
•3:9
.8; 6
.6; 7
-7; 6
.5;13
.4; 5
°4;13
o0;12
.3; 7
.4; 5
•3; 6
.4; 9
,3; 4
.3; 7
1.0; 2
.0; I
.4;;5
o0; 5
.o; 3
.o; 7
.1;lO
.0; 6
°2; 5
.0;i0
.o; 7
.o; 4
.i; 8
°3; 4
.o; 8
.o; 4
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Record of Predicted Responses
Win-Loss
Agree
.6; 5
loO; 7
i.o; 8
.1; 7
1.0; 2
Disagr.'
.o; 3
o0; 2
.0; i
•0; 2
Loss-Win
Agree
.8; 5
.8; 6
°9; 7
•5; 8
1.0; 6
°4; 5 oO; 1
.3; 3
.3; 3 ,o; 1
•7; 3
.4; 7 oO; 1
°3; 7 oO; 1
.2; 5
.4; 7 oO; 2
°7; 3 .5; 2
oO; i .o; 8
,9; 8
°7; 7
°8; 6
.8; 6
°3; 7
.4; 7
•5; 4
°3; 6
o0; 6
°7; 3
Disagr.
.0; 3
o0; 2
°5; 2
.0; 2
o0; 2
o0; 2
.o; 3
.0; 2
.o; 5
o0; 2
.o; 5
Loss-Loss
Agree Disagro
o0; 2 o0; i
io0; i
.0; 1
.0; i
o0; 1
io0_ I
o0; 1
.0; i
o0_ 1
Io0_ i
°3; 4 oO_ 4
Table i0
disagreements are frequent, e°g° CC & RA and BC & AJ, then the other member's behavior
will be altered by the inclusion of erroneous responses in his decision net° Though
this will lead to less frequent discord, it will also produce less accurate group
as well as individual predictions.
Given these many pitfalls and the evidence of the model's defects, it is
quite surprising that it performs as well as it does° Although other models of the
same processes are not available for comparative testing, it should by now be clear
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how one might construct same. Oneroute would be to start from a different
and perhaps simpler base, and proceed to demonstrate that the samedata can
be accounted for by an alternative set of mechanisms. Another route would
be to take the model presented here and by further investigation refine
and improve upon its hypotheses. Onesuch changewhich seemsto be required
is to permit the Dominancerole to shift back and forth between members
during the group phase. For observations suggest that one memberis not
always assigned the Dominant positlmn throughout the entire set of trials.
To incorporate such a mechanism,however, a procedure would be required
by which Dominancecan be inferred on a trial by trial basis. Thls in turn
might well require the model to draw upon additional data about S's
behavior. Indeed, it might lead to a definition of Dominancein terms of
more customary psychological characteristics which are in turn related to
and evinced by S's decision behavior.
w
Manifestly, there are many directions in which research on these
processes can proceed. Though such a statement is true of most models of
human behavior, the points of particular interest i_ this case are:
(i) there is a simple, replicable experlmentsl tssk with:_which sequentially
linked behavior of both individuals and groups can be generated; (ii) there
is a model that can infer the decision processes of individuals from the data
learning and interpersonal influence which are central to the study of group
behavior; (iv) progress is frequently more rapid when one builds upon the
replicable work of others; and (v) until other comparable, process models
are constructed, there is no completely satisfactory way of Judging the per-
formance of this or any other such decision model.
Chapter V
The Permanence of the Presumed Influence
From the data of the last chapter it is apparent that the two influence
processes contribute substantially to the model's predictive capacity°
One is entitled to infer from these results that Self as well as Inter-
personal Influence takes place, and that the model's processes are one way
of representing such behavior. In effect, there are grounds for arguing that
when influence takes place it is reflected in a change in decision behavior,
and that these changes can be represented by alterations in the relevant
discrimination nets°
Given this schema for representing influence, and given that the
model accounts, in part, for the observed behavior, a query irmnediately
arises as to the permanence of such alterations in S' decision behavior.
During the group decision phase it is clear that S's alter their behavior
to be inl accord with their colleagueso But it is an open question as to
whether S's will continue to exhibit influenced behavior if they are
requested after Stage 2 to perform the experimental task by themselves°
It will be recalled that the experimental design included a third stage
where S's were asked to do the task by themselves for thirty trials.
0_IThus, the data generated during _ are u_ed us L_L_ basis from -_'^_ _--WIL JU_LL L%2
test for the permanence of the influence effected during Stage 2°
Since all S's participate in Stage 3 one can divide the total sample
into two classes= those who were the Dominant member in their group and
those who were not. The Non-Dominant members were subject to more influence
attempts. Hence, one would expect their Stage 3 behavior to provide
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clearer evidence as to whether their behavior has been permanently
altered.
Before proceeding to describe the tests in detail, it is first
necessary to define the null hypotheses. If participation in group
decisions has no lasting effect upon an individual's behavior, then one
should be able to explain his Stage 3 behavior by using the decision net
which represented his behavior at the beginning of Stage 2. In other
words, the discrimination net built by the Mimic Procedure will be
sufficient to account for S's Stage 3 behavior if the effects of group
decision-making can be ignored.
An alternative position would be to argue that the group experience
has a lasting effect upon an individual's behavior. In this event, the
discrimination nets which represent them at the end of Stage 2 are the
ones to be used in explaining the data of Stage 3. A variant of this
alternative would be to employ as the explanatory discrimination net the
one that results from Model Sl. This net will only contain the effects of
the Interpersonal Influence process. Its use is rationalized by arguing
that such Self influence as takes place during the group phase is a
response to the situation at the time and will not carry over to Stage 3.
These alternatives are used to define three models of individual
_ behavior. Model A uses the decision nets generated by the Mimic
Procedure at the end of _o It represents the hypothesis that_the
effects of group decision-making can be ignored. Model B incorporates the
decision nets that result from Model SI at the end of Stage 2o Accordingly,
it stands for the case where the effects of interpersonal influence are
considered important contributors to the explanation of Stage 3 behavior.
The third and last hypothesis, Model C, employs the decision nets that
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result from Model 3 at the end of Stage 2. This model represents the claim
that the effects of both influence processes must be considered if the
data of Stage 3 are to be explained.
Given these models the null hypotheses can then be stated as:
(i) The number of correct responses obtained by Model A is the same
as those produced by Model B.
(ii) The number of correct responses obtained by Model A is the same
as those produced by Model C.
The tests used are those of the Chi-square and the Student to Since
are
one is dealing with responses of individuals there/only three columns of
scores. Hence, Chi-square has 2 degrees of freedom which is somewhat
low for a proper application of this statistic. On the other hand, the
Student _ now employs one-third of the total data, and as a consequence
is a stronger test than it was before.
The Chi-square test data for the Non-Dominant and Dominant members
are presented in Tables i and lao
Data of Model A vs Model B
Non-Dominant S's Dominant S's
-- u
Diro Side Total Dir. Side Total
300
315
oi - Ei -15
(Oi E_i)2/E i °75
249
251
-2
.02
206
212
307
310
-6 -3
°18 .03
254
256
-2
.02
209
213
Table I
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Data of Model A vs Model C
2
(_i - _i) /_i
Non-Dominant S's
Dir. Side
311
315
-4
.05
{
I 242251
Total
I
208212
Dominant S's
Dir. Side Total
315
310
-9 -4 5
.08.34 .08
I
249
256
-7
.20
204
213
-9
.40
Table la
The values of Chi-square from Table I are _2 = 0°95 and _2 = 0.13
for Non-Dominant and Dominant respectively. From Table la they are
2 = 0.47 and_ = 0.68 respectively° None of these values is significant
at the .05 level. Hence, the null hypotheses cannot be rejected for either
sample of individuals.
As one might expect, the Chi-square values are slightly larger if one
considers those individuals who are members of the Reduced sample groups.
The values are given in Table 2, and they are non-significant at the =05
level. This absence of significance is evident in the Student t scores
which are also presented in Table 2.
It should be noticed, however, that in both Tables Model A produces
the superior results. Thus, one can conclude that these S's were not
permanently influenced by their group decision experience. Though_ this
may strike the reader as strange, the data are surprisingly clear.
During Stage 3 S's behaved as though they remembered how they played
in Stage I and preferred this method to that which they participated in
during Stage 2.
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Summary of Test Results
Null Hypothesis
Total Sampi_ ...... J
=
=
=
=
0.95, 0o13
2.38, 0.01
At .05 level with 2 d.f._ 2 = 5.99
At .05 level with 18 dofo t = 1.73
Signif. at
.05 level
No, No
No, No
No, No
No, No
Student t
_tatistic
0.46 [1) 0.24 (1_
1.60, 0.15
0.21 (1) 0.58(I'_
1.49, 0.29
Signif. at
.05 level
No, No
No, No
No, No
No, No
I
(I) At .05 level with 28 d.f. t = 1.70
f
Table 2
From the data of Tables i and la it is apparent that Model A has the
best predictive record. Accordingly, the next step is to compare its
behavior with that of the random model used earlier (see Chapter III, Sec. 3)°
Though a comparison with a random response generator is not as neat and tidy
as one would like, the data are presented in Table 3 in a manner similar to
that used in Table li, Chapter iii.
The results in Table 3 are, in part, surprisingly good. For if one
considers the two columns of Total proportion correct, Model A is
performing significantly better than one would achieve by rolling appropriately
sided die. What these data suggest is that the discrimination nets
produced by the Mimic Procedure do represent, to a considerable degree,
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Results on Test of Model A vs Model R
JS & JB
ER& RF
JH&RB
TR & DA
DP & JP
CR & DS
AH& GB
DB & MG
FH & FV
DM& JK
JF&LB
LZ & EJ
SC &RA
BC & AJ
rMcC & LH
Non-Dominant S's
Iprop= of
Dir.
Chosen
Correctly
.83*
.69*
.90*
.59
•79*
.83*
.69*
.41
.59
.55
.86*
.79
•83*
•76*
.79*
i Prop. of
Side
Chosen
Correctly
ITotal
I Prop.
Chosen
Correctly
Dominant S' s
llProp, of Prop. of
IIDir. Side
Chosen Chosen
Correctly Correctly
Total •
Prop.
Chosen
Correctly
.59
.59
•72*
°45
.62
.55
.66
.48
.66
.52
.66
.48
•62
.48
.59
.59*
.48*
°69*
.35
.55*
.48*
.52*
.28
•48*
.28
.62*
.45*
.59*
•45*
.52*
.69*
•83*
•83*
•86*
•69*
.66
.55
.52
•86*
.52
.62
•69*
•90*
•69*
•79*
.52
.66
.69*
.69*
.69*
.66
.38
.55
.59
.48
.69*
.45
.69*
.52
.62
.45*
.59*
.55*
.66*
.52*
.52*
.31
.38
•52*
•35
•45*
.41"
.69*
.41"
•55"
implies that the value is significant at the .05 level.
Table 3
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the decision behavior of these S's. The decision nets not only proved to
be viable bases for the explanation of group behavior, but they can also
be applied directly to account for each S's subsequent individual behavior.
The record of proportions of Sides chosen correctly is poor. One
could subject these data to the binomial test as before, but there is
little to be gained by doing so. For the results on Direction and Total
columns will pass such tests while those of the Side columns will not.
What is p=rhaps of greater interest is to note the data of one or two
specific groups, in particular ER & RF, and 31{ & RB. Model A accounts
for a substantial amount of their bidding behavior. If one looks back at
the data of Table II, Chapter III, it is apparent that Model 3 accounts
for a considerable amount of their StaRe 2 behavior. These results suggest
that these individuals had stable decision rules. That which is sufficient
to account for their Stage I behavior is also sufficient to account for
their subsequent group and individual behavior. In keeping with this line
of reasoning one would therefore expect those groups for which Model 3
was a poor predictor to be unacceptably explained by Model A. Model 3
had considerable difficulty with groups DB & MG, and OM & JK. In Table 3
it is clear that Model A was unable to account for much Of their Stage 3
behavior. In effect, these individuals are non-stable. They decided
during Stages I and 2 to alter their decision -"_^_ rapid] than the
_ _=_== re=re y
model is able to accommodate.
These data point out quite clearly the group decisinn model's strong
as well as weak points, to wit: If individuals maintain a set of decision
procedures it_is possible both to infer what these rules are and account
for their subsequent group o_ individual behavior. If they continue to
alter their decision rules as the experiment progresses the model is not
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capable of keeping up with and accounting for their behavior. In brief, the
model is much better at accounting for stable rather than unstable decision
behavior. A more adaptive model, it is hoped, could encompass that which
the curr=LLt one is unable to_ And further research is being conducted
to discover the processes which will permit the group decision model to
explain the data of recalcitrant individuals and groups.
Chapter Vl
Summary and Conclusions
The objective of this research has been to develop the rudiments of
a testable theory of group decision-making behavior. At the beginning of
the paper five problems were identified. It was felt that answers would
have to be provided for same if such a theory was to be constructed.
Having presented both the theory and some test data it is now appropriate
to assess the merit of the answers that this theory provides.
The first problem concerned the choice of a basic unit for the theory°
Ought it to be the group itself or its individual members? The approach
chosen was to focus upon the individual. It was hypothesized that if one
could develop an adaptive theory of individual behavior, then a group's
behavior would be a predictive resultant of the interaction of models of
such individuals. The theoretical justification for relying upon a theory
of individual behavior forms what was called the second postulate of invari-
ance. It posits the existence of certain invariances between the structure
of individual and group decision processes. It permits one to infer the
behavior of a group from a knowledge of the decision processes of its
participants. In effect, it entitles one to reduce _^--_=L_=_ v_....g_n_ip
decision-making to the level of the individual units.
The theory itself is based upon information processing theories of
individual behavior. This approach was chosen as it permits the specifica-
tion of decision processes in greater, testable detail than any other
theoretical system. Indeed, it should be noted that the theory of group
decision behavior is endowed with no more capabilities than are found in
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other theories of human decision-making behavior (Simon & Kotovsky, 1963).
For example, the theory postulates that each individual is capable of
developing his decision rules in terms of the attributes of the experimental
_i._., e.g_ _he decision situations W-W, WL, L__WW,L__LL;previous responses; etc.
/
The theory also posits that once an individual has constructed a rule he is
capable of employing it whenever it is called for, i.e., whenever it is
activated by the stimulus-situation. In addition, the theory is provided
with the ability to notice both differences and similarities between
symbols, and is able to k_ep track of a small number of such symbols in
immediate memory at one time. The remaining properties are described in
detail in Chapters I and II and need not be repeated. The important point
is that a theory composed of these properties is capable of accounting for
the decision behavior of both individuals and groups. For the test data
indicate that the theory proposed in this paper can be used as the basis
for a theory of group behavior. This in turn implies that the second
postulate of invariance has empirical merit.
Given a theory of group behavior that is based upon the behavior of
its members, the next question to be resolved is how to determine the
decision behavior of those individuals. The solution proposed by this
research is to give the theory of individual behavior the task of learning
to behave like (mimic) the subjects in question. To de this a record must
be available of the requisite decision behavior. That such a procedure
generates the desired decision rules is evidenced by the theory's ability
to predict each S's decision both during and after the group experience.
The main failing of the present theory is its inability to accommodate
unstable decision behavior. But, if S's maintain their decision rules,
the theory is able to generate discrimination nets which in turn can be
used to account for their subsequent behavior.
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The next two prob&ems are concerned with identifying the leader-
follower relation and the effects on decision behavior of the group decision
process. The theory resolves the former by assigning as leader the more
conservative member of each group. This rule is based upon the supposition
a
that there is/conservative social norm, relevant to behavior in market
situations, prevalent in the populations from which subjects were drawn.
This supposition turned out to be false for the sample taken from the
population of undergraduate engineers. It was supported, however, by the
sample of graduate students in industrial administration. In the latter
case the more conservative member was the leader in nine out of ten
groups. The theory's solution, while adequate for samples drawn from
graduate students of business, is not a general solution to the problem.
Such a conclusion must not lead one to ignore the importance of selecting
the leader correctly. For, if the leadership (Dominance) role is reversed,
the theory's predictive ability is much reduced.
The effects of group participation are accounted for in the theory by
two procedures: Self and Interpersonal Influence processes. Both processes
are s part of each individual's Monitor and are activated by it whenever
the appropriate conditions are satisfied° That these processes are only
rough approximations is readily admitted. That they contribute substantially
to the explanation of the observed behavior is evinced by th_ empirical
tests. Consequently, the behavior they represent cannot be ignored, and
processes like them must be included in any such theory of group decision-
making.
The final problem posed at the start was that of designing an experi-
mental task and environment which would provide the requisite test data.
The experiment used in this research has many attractive features. It
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permits both individuals and groups to generate observable, sequentially
linked behavior. The task is simple and yet subjects do not arrive with
any "ready-made" procedures for dealing with it. As there are no "correct"
strategies, _ubject_ develop decision rules based upon attributes and values
of the task that cometo their attention. In short, subject behavior is
task dependent. Such a situation makesthe inference of their decision
rules somewhateasier. For, if subjects brought decision rules with them
into the experiment, their characteristics would not depend principally on
the task itself. This would increase the difficulty of inferring their
• decision rules from their behavior. That the experiment does generate data
from which decision rules can be inferred is evident from the test results°
Given a replicable experimental task and a theory that is sufficient
to account for the behavior of two person groups, the next important step
would appear to be the extension Of the theory to include triads. The
introduction of a third person raises a number of intriguing questions:
Can the theory as stated, or with minor modifications, account for the
pattern of coalitions that emerge? Can it also accommodatesuch bargaining
as occurs, and the effects of sameon the decision behavior of each
individual.
What is being suggested is a further test on the theory's ability to
explain group decision-making behavior° For, if it can be sho_. to be
sufficient to account for three person groups, other extensions become
easier to foresee. Though the process of adding a third person has just
begun there does not appear to be any reason why this theory of group
decision behavior will not encompassthe behavior of triads as readily as
it has that of the dyiads reported here.
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